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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
SECTION 1 .

The purpose of this thesis is to bring to light the

problems encountered by Henry Sidgwick in his attempt to base

morality^ on the so-called utilitarian principle.

According to

utilitarianism, the only moral principle is that one ought to
strive for the greatest happiness of the greatest number of
people.

2

Although happiness can be defined more broadly, the

utilitarians define it as pleasure alone.

Henry Sidgwick (1838 - 1900) is generally recognized as the
last of a line of English thinkers to develop primarily this

utilitarian position.

A study of Sidgwick* s thought is especially

useful for gaining an understanding of the problems of utilitarianism.

1.

It is so not only because of his chronological position

I shall use the terms "morality" and

M

ethics” as synonyms

throughout this thesis.

There is an ethioal theory which is somewhat similar to this
2.
but which substitutes the word "good” for the word "happiness”.
This theory is called ideal utilitarianism and its most prominent
exponent was G. E. Moore. According to this theory many other
things as well as happiness should be maximized.

2-

but also because part of the reason for his
occupying this

position is that he so clearly recognized these problems.

Indeed,

at least one critic states that Sidgwick* s attempt
to solve its

problems almost carried him beyond utilitarianism altogether. 5
Utilitarianism, and Sidgwick as its last exponent, are often

understood as representing part of a more general form of ethical
philosophy known as hedonism.

According to hedonism, the only

moral principle is that one ought to strive fori
a.

the greatest pleasure of the agent, or

b.

the greatest pleasure of the greatest number of people.

When the principle is stated in terms of the first alternative it
is called egoistic, or sometimes individualistic, hedonism.

Mem-

bers of the ancient Greek schools of Epicureanism and Cyrenaicism,
as well as

modem thinkers such

hedonism of this sort.

as Thomas Hobbes, maintained a

The second alternative, whioh I have re-

ferred to as utilitarianism, is sometimes called universalistio

hedonism by Sidgwick.

The principle exponents of utilitarianism,

prior to Sidgwick, were Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.

Hedonistic utilitarianism occurs in two forms.

The difference

between the two regards not the goal of utilitarianism but the way
in which this goal is aohieved.

According to the form maintained

by Bentham and Mill, which was in general an historically later
form, the greatest happiness (i.e. pleasure) of the greatest number

3.

Albee, A History of English Utilitarianism , p. 368.

- 3xs achieved, directly.

By making a comparative measurement of

the pleasure resulting from different possible
courses of action,
one chooses that action which will maximize
the general pleasure.

This form is more commonly associated with the
name '’utilitarianism”.

The position of the earlier utilitarianism was that one

should obey unconditional rules of duty which, however, were
such
that unquestioned obedience to them would itself achieve the

utilitarian end.

Although Sidgwick is, chronologically, the last

of the hedonistic utilitarians, he seems to favor the earlier over
the later form.

SECTION 2 .

I begin my study with two chapters on Sidgwick* s

hedonistic background.

In Chapter II, I point out some of the

problems of egoistic hedonism which, as it happens, developed

earlier than either form of utilitarianism.

This survey also

functions as a brief historical review of all hedonistic theories

prior to Bentham.
ianism.

I only note here the earlier form of utilitar-

Since Sidgwick carefully discusses the problems of this

form, these problems will be more thoroughly considered in

Chapter VI.

Chapter II also reveals, especially in the arguments

of Butler and Hume, reasons for developing utilitarianism as an
alternative to egoistic hedonism.
In Chapter III, I present the later form of utilitarianism,

propounded by Bentham and Mill, indicating what they understood

morality to be and how they reduced it to utilitarianism.

My

-4-

reason for considering this later form more
thoroughly than the
earlier one is twofold.

Firstly, the proponents of the later form

were Sidgwick' s immediate predecessors and his
oriticism of their
positions was the point of departure for his own
theory.

Secondly,

Sidgwick himself presents a rather thorough defense
of the earlier
form.
I proceed, in Chapter IV, to expose the problems
which

Sidgwick found in the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill,
partic-

ularly with regard to what they accepted as proof of their theories.
Ihen, in Chapter V and Chapter VI, I present Sidgwick* s own
attempt
to reestablish utilitarianism on a firmer foundation.

The problems

which he encountered, in so doing, were only partially recognized

by him.

In Chapter VI are indicated the problems he encountered,

and generally recognized in trying to make utilitarianism work.
In Chapter VII, I discuss problems of his utilitarianism which he

failed to recognize and which lay hidden until exposed by his
critics.

SECTION 5 *

One may attempt to reduce morality to a single prin-

ciple either by discrediting all other principles or by positively

establishing one’s own.

Sidgwick and hie predecessors use both

techniques and both, indeed, are neoessary unless one assumes that
there must be one and only one valid moral principle.

It is

plausible however that there may be none at all or that there may
be several.

If there are none at all, it is not sufficient to

discredit other principles.

If there are several, it is not

- 5-

sufficient to positively establish one’s own.
The two techniques are designated in this
thesis as positive
and negative aspects of the "proof" of
utilitarianism.
I

By proof

merely mean whatever arguments a thinker advances in
order to

reduoe morality to this principle.

The positive aspect of proof

may conveniently be divided into proof of the validity and
proof
of the workability of utilitarianism.
The distinction between positive and negative aspects of

proof is one distinction by which the content of the thesis is
organized.

For the discussion of Bentham and Mill, these differ-

ent aspects of proof are considered in different sections of

Chapter III.
proof.

Chapter IY presents the negative aspect of Sidgwick's

Chapter V concerns his positive proof for the validity of

utilitarianism and Chapter VT, his positive proof for the workability of it.

SECTION 4 .

The problems of Sidgwick's utilitarianism, which it is

my purpose to expose, are not in every case unique to utilitarianism.

well.

Many of them are related to more general moral issues as
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to defining these

issues and certain associated concepts, since an early definition
of them is needed for clarity and perspective.

One great issue concerns whether there is a distinction between the definition of morality and the actual principles which
are moral.

distinction.

At first glance it appears that there must be such a
Take, for example, the proposition with which

-6 -

Sidgwick is concerned, that "only utilitarianism
is moral".

If

this proposition is to have any meaning, there must
be a defi-

nition of morality which is distinct from utilitarianism.

For

if one defines morality as utilitarianism, then Sidgwick’s
pro-

position would be simply that "only utilitarianism is utilitarianism" and this is a mere tautology.

Actually, the issue concerning whether the definition of

morality is distinct from moral principles is not so easily
answered, but relates to another issue concerning what the

definition would be if it was considered distinct.
If the definition is considered distinct from the principles

then a further distinction within the definition may be made.

For though all ethical philosophers would probably agree that
morality is, roughly, a sort of standard, they would strongly
disagree on*
a.

the source of the standard and

b.

that to which the standard applies.

Thus it appears that there is a distinction, within the definition
of morality, between the source and the objeot of the moral standard.

I shall here examine these different views as to the source

and object of morality.
The source of the moral standard may be inside or outside
of the moral agent.

Some philosophers claim that the source is

outside— that it is a value independent of the one who holds

it.

According to these thinkers whether or not one wants to, say, tell
the truth is completely irrelevent to its morality.

Truth telling

.

-7-

remains something which you ought to do in
either ease.

It is a

"duty"
Now, if a man’s morality is to he judged
by standards inde-

pendent of what he wants, it can be so judged only
if he is free
to choose or not choose these standards.

Yet it is precisely

this free will that an external standard of morality
seems to
deny.

Duty is defined as something a person does, not because he

wants to but because it is his duty.
the duty which is to do his duty?

But why does this person do

Is that also his duty?

This

sort of answer would apparently lead to an infinite regress in

which a person would never freely choose to do his duty.

Duty

would simply be an external force which determined his choices.*

A second group of philosophers hold that the source of the
moral standard is inside the agent.

wants to do~his interest. 5

It is merely whatever he

This view, however, seems to reduce

moral propositions to tautologies.

If morality is defined as

whatever one wants to do, then the only way to know what principles are moral is to determine what one wants to do.

one wants to do is moral (i.e. what one wants to do).

Thus what

According

David Hume presented an argument similar to this one but sinoe
4*
he held that all actions were predetermined anyway, he was not concerned with the possibility that duty could propel one regardless
of his wishes. He was satisfied to note the infinite regress, as
a ground for holding that the source of the moral standard was interest. (He used the term utility.) See Hume, A Treatise of Human
Nature . Book III, Part II, Seotion If also Jones, A History of
Western Philosophy , Yol. II, p.854*
The terms "interest” and "desire" are used throughout this
thesis as virtual synonyms except for their different grammatical
status.
5.

6
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to this view there is no need for a
distinction between definitions

and principles of morality in the first place.
So much then for two opposing positions on
the source of the

moral standards, and some problems of these positions.
also opposing positions regarding the object.

There are

The object may be

an act, the intention of an act, or the consequences of
an aot.

For the purpose of this thesis, I shall not discuss the distinction
between an act and its intention.

I

shall merely consider what

seems to me the broader distinction between both an act and its

intention on the one hand and the consequences of an act on the
other.

According to the view that the object of the moral standard
is consequences, a lie, for example, is not wrong in itself but

only when it does not produce the results thatt
a.

the agent ought to strive for or

b.

the agent wants.

An objection to the object as consequences is that the consequences
are impossible to measure because they are infinite.

7

One never

knows whether or not, on balanoe, an act will produoe the proper or

6.
This criticism also applies to those who define morality as
whatever a person does in fact do. G. E. Moore, criticizes both
the definition of morality as what a person wants to do, and the
definition as what he does do. His criticism embodies substantially
the argument presented here. See Principla Ethica , Chapter I,
Section 13, (2). Sidgwick uses a related argument in his Methods
of Ethica . See Chapter IV, Section 4 of this thesis.

Although Sidgwick believes in the importance of considering
consequences, he himself reoognizes this difficulty.
7.

•

-9-

desired result.

When an act or the intention of an act is
considered to he
the object of morality then that aforementioned
lie or the in-

tention to lie would he considered wrong or right in
itself.

In

discussing this viewpoint, I shall use the term act in
reference
to either the act or the intention.

An act cannot he the object of the moral standard until the
act is defined.

For it is not obvious at what point the act ends

and the consequences begin.
for defining the act.

There are two alternative procedures

One alternative is to define it in accord

with one's own or someone else's interest.

The second alternative

i8 to define it independently of anyone's interest.

For example, murder is commonly defined in such a way as to
include, primarily, commissions and not ommissions.

Thus to

fatally shoot someone is murder hut to choose, in a world of
limited resources, to preserve yourself by letting others starve
to death is not.

Some would say this definition was divinely

given and independent of all personal interest.

Others would in-

sist that it was based on nothing but the self interest of the

ascendent person.

Regardless of what the source of morality is presumed to be,

Sidgwick notes that "... it is difficult to draw the line between an act and its consequences. . ." A person may, by telling
truth to a jury, knowingly lead them to a false conclusion concerning the accused. Disregard of consequences is only possible
"... where common usage of terms adequately defines what events
are to be included in the general notions of the acts, and what
regarded as their consequences." See The Methods of Ethics ,
pp. 96-97
8.

.
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if the moral standard is applied to acts
defined according to

interest then morality as a whole is obviously
reduoed to interest.
Furthermore, where the act is defined independent of
interest but
the source of morality is interest then again morality
as a whole
is mere interest.

Only where both the act and the source are in-

dependent of interest is an interest ethics avoided.
The problems of making an act the object of morality will be,

because of their peculiar character, more easily discussed in the

following section.

SECTION 3 *

The discussion of general moral issues has now been

completed.

It is already evident that there are objections to

both views of the source of the moral standard and to one of the
views of the object of it.

Nevertheless, it is necessary in

formulating a definition of morality to accept one of the views
of eaoh of these elements.
There are three different definitions of morality that are

frequently recognized

— the

“right”, the ’'good”, and "interest”.^

Each of these comprises one of the two views of the source of
morality and one regarding the object of it.
Morality defined as the right comprises the source as duty
and the object as that sort of act which is defined without reference to interest.

A lie, according to this definition, is wrong

regardless of whether or not one wants to lie, and regardless of
consequences.

9.

Interest ethics is also sometimes referred to as “naturalism”

- 11 -

Morality defined as interest comprises, in effect,
the source
as interest and the object as an act defined
in any way at all.

(Actually this definition would also include that
circumstance in

which the source is duty but the object is an act
defined by interest.)

According to interest a lie is wrong only ifs

a.

it isn't what you want to do or

b.

it isn't defined as you would like or

Ce

both*

A principal difficulty with both of these definitions is,
oddly enough, that they are too consistent internally.

Morality as

the right denies interest altogether and morality as interest, in

effect, denies the right altogether.

How suppose that you should succeed in showing that the defi-

nition of morality which is really valid is not interest but the
right.

It would appear that your success was at the same time its

own defeat since a morality based entirely on duty seems to deny
the free will which such a morality presupposes. (See pg. 7)

The same paradoxical success seems to occur if you prove that
the really valid definition is not the right but interest.

For a

definition of morality based entirely on interest ceases to be a

definition at all and becomes a mere tautology.

(See pg. 7)

This internal consistency, which rigorously holds these two

definitions to their particular problems, may be called the distinctive problem whioh arises from defining the object of morality
as an act.
a nd thus the

In each case the proposition is its own contradiction

more firmly it is asserted, the more firmly it seems

12 to be denied.

In contrast to these two internally consistent
definitions
is the definition of morality as the good.

This definition is

not internally consistent.

There are two ways in which morality can be defined as
the

good— the hedonistic and the agathistic.

According to the good

generally, a lie is neither moral nor immoral in itself.

or not it becomes so depends upon the results it produces
consequences.

Whether
its

The specifically hedonistic form of the good is

that an act (here the lie) is moral if it results in pleasure but

otherwise it is not.

The agathistic form of the good is that a

lie is moral if it has some other specified result such as wisdom

or beauty.
Both forms of the good axe based on belief that the object of

morality is consequences.

There is, however, a difference between

them in terms of the source.

For the agathistic good, the source

of morality is an independent value— a duty.

Thus if wisdom is

what you ought to get (independent of your desire for it) then a
lie which helps you to get it is moral.

The agathistic good is, in terms of its source, similar to the

right .

But while the right avoids interest altogether, the

agathistic good does not.

What is ultimately good is, it is true,

determined independently of interest.

On the other hand, the fact

that it is pursued means that there must be a sort of interest in
it.

Writers who hold this view maintain that the value makes itself

- 13 -

resting .

Plato and Aristotle, for example, both
thought that

mere recognition of the good would lead you
to pursue it.

There is, however, a serious difficulty with
the agathistic
good.

If the value is interesting, it is so
because the moral

agent already has the required interest.

For example, one could

not inculcate the principle of fairness in a child
by associating
it with, say, self respect unless the child wanted
self respect.

But this interest which makes an individual receptive to
the aopeal

of the value must itself be created by an independent value.

Other-

wise, one will have not an agathistic good but an interest ethics
,

how if this interest is created by a value, then there must be a
further interest.

It seems apparent that the definition of morality

as the agathistic good leads to infinite regress or else results in

interest ethics.
One can attempt to resolve this problem of the agathistic good
in another way by claiming (as in fact Sidgwick does) that the duty

itself gives an "impulse” to action without any need for interest

per se.

This argument, however, seems to transform the agathistic

good back into its analogue— the right.

In that case it faces the

usual criticism of the right that there seems to be no free will.

For the hedonistic good the source of morality is interest.
If wisdom is what you want to get, for example, then a lie which

helps you to get it is moral.
The hedonistic good is, in terms of its source, similar to
interest ethics .

Their different objects are reflected in two dif-

ferent definitions of pleasure which are frequently employed.

- 14 -

According to one definition, pleasure means interest
per
what you want.

se—

When an interest ethics is called hedonistic

(which it sometimes is) this is the definition being
used.

The

second definition of pleasure is that it is the satisfaction
of

what you want.

This definition applies to the hedonistic good

and is, perhaps, the more commonly employed one.

While interest avoids any independent value whatsoever, the
hedonistic good does not.

According to hedonism, al though inter-

est ultimately determines the end, this end is in a sense inde-

pendent.

Writers who hold this view maintain that interest makes

the satisfaction of itself an independent value .

Thus what you

are interested in, and therefore pursue, is not some specific entity

itself suoh as wisdom or beauty, but rather the satisfaction of interest in such wisdom or beauty.

As will be shown, Mill and Bentham

maintain this position.
The hedonistic good seems to encounter as serious a difficulty
as does the agathistic good.

If the moral agent creates a value

out of the satisfaction of his interest, then he must have an interest in this value different from the interest which is a constituent

of the value.

For example, suppose that one has a desire for wisdom.

If the satisfaction of the desire for wisdom consequently becomes

a "good”, then there must be a desire for this good, in other words
a "higher" desire for the satisfaction of the initial desire.

This

higher desire, or interest, must also become a value— the satisfaction of the higher desire.

Otherwise, at the level of the higher

desire, which is fundamental, one would have not a hedonistic good

- 15 -

—

- ari

izitereat ethics .

If the higher desire makes its own satis-

faction a value as well, then there must be an
even higher desire
for this value.

In other words if the desire for the satisfaction

of the desire for wisdom is, in itself, good, then
there must be a

desire for the satisfaction of the desire for the
satisfaction of
the desire for wisdom.

It seems apparent that the hedonistic good,

like the agathlstlc, leads to infinite regress.

One can attempt to resolve this problem in another way by

claiming (as Mill and Bentham do) that the value is a "first principle", but is not thereby independent of interest.

Unless one

believes that a mere process of labelling can solve problems,
however, it seems that this argument simply transforms the hedonistic

good back into its analogue— interest ethics.

In that case it faces

the usual criticism that moral propositions are reduced to tautologies.

Having discussed some of the problems which arise from the internal inconsistency of morality when it is defined as the good, I

now want to indicate what seems to be its unique advantage.

Suppose

one should succeed in establishing the validity of the hedonistic
as opposed to the agathistic good.

One would not thereby have auto-

matically defeated oneself as seems to be the case in an attempt to
establish the right or interes t.
self contradictory *

For neither form of the good is

This does not mean, however, that the moral

agent is necessarily better off with morality defined as a form of
the good than he would be if it were defined as the right or interest.

In the case of either form of good there is an additional pro-

blem which has already been mentioned in the previous seotion.

- 16 -

Locality as the good measures the consequences of an act
(rather
than the act itself) hut the co nsequences
are infinite and there,

fore impossible to measure.
choices.

Paced with this fact, one h a s two

One can postulate an infinite moral code hut
this will

convert an ethics of good into a straightforward
ethics of right.
If, however, one doesn't do this, he will he left
to interpret

the morality of an act only in terms of interest.

This alter-

native converts the ethics of good into an ethics of interest.
SECTION 6 .

One may now say that altogether there are four dif-

ferent ways of defining morality, each of which seems to have
serious logical difficulties.

When a philosopher attempts to

reduce morality to some one principle he will inevitably en-

counter these difficulties either directly or indirectly.

may also encounter empirical difficulties

— difficulties

He

resulting

from the fact that moral action must occur within the limitations
of time and space.

Actually these so-called empirical difficul-

ties raise other logical difficulties, particularly in connection

with the question as to whether time and space are dimensions within which moral action occurs or attributes of the moral agent
himself.

have to he

Consideration of these other logical difficulties will
emitted in a limited thesis of this sort, resulting

in a necessarily oversimplified treatment of the empirical difficulties.

In addition to the difficulties involved in defining morality,
one might also expect to find difficulties in establishing, within

- 17 -

any particular definition, those actual
principles which are moral.

Sidgwick does seem to conceive of his function
as involving both
steps.

It should be noted, however, that the
difficulties involved

in establishing speoific principles, seem often
to be a reflection

of the difficulties in the definitions upon which they
are based.

For example, there do not seem to be any distinct problems
in

knowing what exactly is moral if morality is defined either as interest or as the hedonistic good.
one wants.

It is a matter of knowing what

In the case of the right or the agathistic good, prin-

ciples will have to be ultimately established by some kind of

intuition and the kind of intuition employed can itself only be

referred to another intuition—not to interest.
This thesis is concerned with exposing the problems Sidgwick

encounters in his attempt to reduce morality to the principle of
utilitarianism.

Particular attention will be paid to the logica l

difficulties involved in defining morality and it is for that

reason that these have been discussed at some length here.

In the

following chart, the four different definitions are listed, together with their distinctive problems.

For convenience in sub-

sequent discussion the definitions of the right and interest have

been generally designated as "monisms” to indicate*
1.

that either interest or duty is completely denied*

2.

that in consequence, both definitions seem to be self

contradictory.

Also as a matter of convenience the two definitions of the good
have been designated as "dualisms" to indicate*
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that

Merest

and.

duty are combined in some way in each

definition;
2.

that in consequence both definitions require
the impossible
task of measuring infinite consequences.

oidgwick’s attempt to reduce morality to
utilitarianism will

necessarily involve two steps (though as it happens not
explicitly).
First it must be established that morality is defined
dualistically
and not monistically; for utilitarianism is a goal to be
pursued
and thus a good.

Secondly it must be established that the good is

of one particular sort.

It might at first appear that utilitar-

ianism is a species of hedonistic good and that it is therefore
this form of good which should be established.

sarily the case however.

Such is not neces-

In the loose sense used in Section 1,

utilitarianism is a form of hedonistic good.
sense it does not seem to be so.

In a stricter logical

For to the individual moral agent)

the pursuit of the general happiness is virtually as independent

of his own interest as would be the pursuit of wisdom, beauty or

any similar goal.

In this sense utilitarianism is a species of the

agathistic good.

From the preceding discussion it would appear then that
Sidgwick must*
a.

establish that morality is defined as some form of the

good and not as the right or interest;
b.

establish that morality is the agathistic and not the

hedonistic good.
o.

establish, by an intuition of course, that the only
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prinoiple which ia good is utilitarianism.

Insofar as Sidgwick concerns himself with
logioal as well as
empirical difficulties of ethics he does, to
some extent, follow a

procedure of this sort.

Nevertheless there are two important

qualifications to this statement.

In the first place Sidgwick is

not clearly and unambiguousl y concerned with reducing
ethics to
ai*i an i sm .

lie

is often considered a utilitarian but in his

principal ethical work he implies, in the introduotoiy
chapter,
that he is primarily concerned with establishing the validity
of
all clearly distinct definitions of morality.

Actually his book

involves a mixture of both purposes.
The second qualification, related to the first, is that

Sidgwick is no more willing than were some of his predecessors to
accept utilitarianism as an expression of only one of the two forms
of good.

He hopes, as they did, that the pursuit of the general

happiness is somehow at the same time the pursuit of one's own.
Thus utilitarianism would be a principle which affirmed and also

combined both the agathistic and the hedonistic good.
It would be difficult to explore all the arguments involved

in these various purposes.

I Bhall concentrate, in this thesis,

on an attempt to trace that thread of argument whioh is used to
reduce morality to utilitarianism, noting the other purposes as
they relate thereto.

Given the above qualifications, Sidgwick's "proof" of

utilitarianism involves the three steps previously noted.

This

proof will also involve positive and negative aspects as were
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discussed in Section

5.

In view of the problems of the different

definitions of morality, one can predict that
the positive aspect
of proof will involve j
a.

resolving the problem of measuring infinite
consequences

which any good seems to require;
b.

eliminating the infinite regress of duties which an
agathistic good seems to encounter.

I'or

the negative aspect of proof there are at hand all of
the

difficulties which confront the three other definitions of morality

Throughout the following chapters, the various logical difficulties heretofore noted should be kept in mind,

f/hether or not

these difficulties are directly recognized by the thinker, they

are always present and may well be the source of whatever diffi-

culties do appear, even though these appear in greatly altered form

CHAPTER II

HEDONISM PRIOR TO BENTHAM
SECTION l .

1

Hedonism (understood in its loose sense and not as

the hedonistic good) occurs in two forms which may be called

egoistic hedonism and universalistic hedonism (or utilitarianism).

In the history of hedonism, the egoistic form was, in

general, the first to be developed.

Not until the seventeenth

century was the universalistic form, of which Sidgwick was the
last exponent, clearly set forth.

Although I am primarily con-

cerned with the problems of utilitarianism, it is necessary for

me to briefly review the earlier form of hedonism.
essary for two reasons.

This is nec-

Firstly, some of the principal problems

of hedonism which Sidgwick encounters had already been exposed in

earlier times.

Secondly, it was the severe critioism of egoistic

hedonism by David Hume and others that provided some of the impetus
for the development of utilitarianism, particularly the earlier
form.

The exposition of this section is based on the following
sources s Plato, The Republio and The Philebus ; Randall and Buchler
Philosophy* An Introduction * and Watson, Hedonistic Theories from
Aristippus to Spencer .
1.
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Cyrenaicisa, an ancient Greek school of
thought, is often

recognized as the first systematic expression of
egoistic hedonism.
Its members held that one should pursue the
pleasure of the moment,

primarily sensual pleasure, and should avoid
thought
prevented full enjoyment.

‘The

— for

thought

Cyrenaics held furthermore that

nothing was immoral, no matter how much it might seem
so, if it
provided such pleasure.
I hose

who adhered to the later Greek school of Epicureanism

agreed that the individual

1

s

pleasure was the only good but they

meant by this the pleasure of life as a whole, not that of the
moment.

The Epicureans also agreed that nothing pleasurable was

immoral but they held that most so-called immoral acts carried with

them the painful fear of punishment and so really were immoral.

Both Plato and Aristotle criticized these hedonistic principles and presented various arguments to show that the pursuit of

pleasure was self- defeating.

Some of these arguments, together

with later ones, constitute what has come to be called the
"Hedonistic Paradox".

Plato observed that it was logically impossible to pursue

pleasure alone, for pleasure which was separate even from consciousness was no more than animal experience and could hardly be called
pleasure at all.

Yet we noticed above that the Cyrenaics meant to

attain virtually this sort of pleasure.
its difficulty?

How then did they avoid

They did so by a certain lack of consistency.

Thought interfered with pleasure, so they said, but nevertheless
on8 should use all one's cunning to determine the relative pleasure
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which attended the various goods of life.
Aristotle, in his criticism, observed that if the
hedonists

were successful in achieving great pleasure, then
they could not

possibly achieve the pleasure of life as a whole since
individual
pleasurable experiences would distract one from necessary reflection.

Now the Epicureans did expect to do both and, like the

Cyrenaics, their attempt here required some inconsistency.

Greatest pleasure for the Epicureans meant merely mental serenity
and, in general, avoidance of pain.

Thus according to Plato and Aristotle if you sought pleasure

directly you were not apt to achieve it; and the inconsistencies
in the hedonism of their time seemed to bear out this contention.
It might be noted that these arguments of Plato and Aristotle are,
on their face, empirical arguments.

The conscious reflective

pursuit of pleasure cannot be undertaken simultaneously with an

unconscious spontaneous enjoyment of it.

The factor of time pre-

vents this.

SECTION 2.

2

Although Epicurus had held that one ought to seek

only one’s own happiness, he had not, a3 had Thomas Hobbes in the

modern period, rigidly maintained that man oould seek nothing else.

For Hobbes, man was a thoroughgoing egoist whose impulses were all
strictly determined.

John Locke also held this view though, in

order to permit man to achieve his greatest overall happiness, he

The following exposition is based on these sources* Jones,
A History of Western Philosophy Vol. II; oidgwick, Outlines of
The History of Ethics for English Readers * and Watson, H edonistic
Theories from Aristippus to Spencer .
2.
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also held inconsistently that a man could
suspend these impulses

and exercise thought.

David Hume, who agreed with Hobbes and
that

part of Locke which was deterministic, denied
however that man was

naturally egoistic.

On the one hand, he argued empirically that

the facts did not indicate this.

Perhaps more important however

was his logical argument, an argument which had
previously been

advanced by Joseph Butler.

Hume maintained that pleasure was, as

it certainly appeared to be, the satisfaction of a desire.

Now

obviously one couldn't satisfy a desire unless one had a desire
iix

the first place.

And this first desire would then have to be

for something other than pleasure.

Therefore, stated Hume, it was

obvious that a man could not seek only his own pleasure

— it

was

logically impossible.
It appears that this argument which Hume and Butler advance

against egoistic hedonism is a reexpression of the logical difficulty which faces the hedonistic good.

According to the argument

in Chapter I, the satisfaction of interest must be the object of
a higher interest whose satisfaction must in turn be the object

of a still higher interest and so on ad infinitum.

Suppose how-

ever that one persists in claiming that the satisfaction of interest is the object of the self same interest.

The difficulties of

this position are those revealed by the argument of Butler and
Hume.

Hume's argument seems conclusive against egoistic hedonism.

However, in Hume's time and earlier, the tendency was not to discard

hedonism completely but to present it primarily in the utilitarian
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form/
From the time of Richard Cumberland there
had been English

moralists who held that moral actions must be
directed to achieve-

ment of the general happiness/

These early utilitarians held,

however, that one did not pursue the general happiness
directly.

Morality required obedience to absolute rules but these
rules were
of just such a sort as to bring about this result if followed.

Hume severely criticized the notion of absolute rules, claiming
that whatever a man did was always ultimately a matter of interest

This criticism had considerable influence on Jeremy Bentham who,
as we shall see in the next chapter, changed the nature of utili-

tarianism to a straightforward hedonism of the universal is tic sort
The utilitarianism of Bentham was not developed as an alternative
to egoistio hedonism however.

It comprised both forms of hedonism

Hume did not even discard egoistic hedonism.
3.
the contention that it was the sole end of man.

He denied only

Cumberland himself spoke of the general good rather than the
general happiness.

4*

CHAPTER III
SIDGWICK'S UTILITARIAN BACKGROUND

SECTION 1 .

Jeremy Bentham

1

is often considered the first major

exponent of the direct form of utilitarianism.

While the earlier

utilitarians had held that doing one's duty, whatever it might be,
was the best way to achieve the greatest happiness of the greatest

number of people, Bentham maintained that the best and indeed only
proper way to do this was to determine the overall pleasure re-

sulting from different aots, and to choose those which produced
the most pleasure.

Thus was ushered in that form of utilitar-

ianism which is most commonly associated with the name.
was its most consistent exponent, followed by J. S. Mill

Bentham
2

and

Sidgwick, the last of whom showed a strong tendency back toward

Jeremy Bentham (1748 - 1832) was trained in law but did not
practice it, devoting himself instead to legal and economic theory.
The following discussion of his thought is based on his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789).
1.

John Stuart Mill (1806 - I876) held a permanent position as
2.
head of an important branch of the government administration. The
discussion of his thought is based primarily on his Utilitarianism
(I863) but some reference is also made to the essay On Liberty
(1059).

28the earlier position.

The purpose of this chapter is to present

the positions of Bentham, J. S. Mill, and briefly,
those of

Herbert Spencer.

The latter maintained a special form of utili-

tarianism of considerable influence in Sidgwiok's day.

I shall

concentrate on the aspects of these positions most directly
con-

nected with the reduction of morality to the utilitarian
principle
and those directly criticized by Sidgwick in the development of
his own position.

My analysis of these thinkers is based on the

considerations discussed in Sections 5 through 6 of Chapter I.

consider both the positive and negative aspects of reduction.

I
I

also consider both the definition of morality whieh is given and
the attempt to prove that only utilitarianism is moral.

Actually

the previous chapter's discussion suggests that once a definition

of morality

lias

been established there are no particular problems

involved in determining the principles which are moral.

In any

event, special attention will be paid to the explicit and implicit

definitions of morality which are set forth and upon which the
moral principles axe based.

SECTION 2 .

Bentham defines utility as:

"...that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce
benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness, (all this
in the present case comes to the same thing) or (what comes
again to the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief
pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is con
sidered: if that party be the community in general, then the

Herbert Spencer (1820 - 1905) - The brief comments which
5.
follow are largely based on a synopsis of his ethical works contained in Albee's A History of English Utilitarianism .
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happiness of the community! if a particular
individual,
then the happiness of that individual."^

The principle of utility (i.e. of utilitarianism)
he defines as:
"...that principle which approves or disapproves of every
action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it
appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of
the
party whose interest is in question. . ."5
As he defines it, Bentham’s principle of utility requires
the

pursuit of both individual happiness and general happiness, accord-

ing to which is in Question.

His principle therefore encompasses

both egoistic hedonism and utilitarianism.

One may well ask if

these two forms of hedonism can be reconciled to each other, par-

ticularly since they seem to be based on different definitions of
ethics.

Morality cannot be defined in two different ways unless

these definitions are reconciled to each other.

In the Principles .

Ben them relies on the legislator to make it pleasurable for the
individual to pursue the general welfare, by punishing him if he
does not.

Thus individual morality seems to be reduced to egoistic

hedonism.

So far as the individual is concerned, what is moral is

to pursue his own pleasure but the most expedient way to do this

is to pursue the general pleasure.

The issue is not, however, this clear out for Bentham.

For

when the legislator makes the utilitarian principle attractive,
this principle remains of independent worth even though the person
is pursuing it only because it is to his own self interest.

Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation .
4.
p. 126.
5.

Ibid.

As
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Bentham puts it, the sanctions are sources of
obligatory power.
In the Deontology , a posthumous work
prepared from various un-

published manuscripts, Bentham is presented as
claiming that man

naturally gets most individual pleasure by pursuing
the general
pleasure.

While this may be an inaccurate description of
Bentham* s

position it is possible that he hoped such a state of
affaire

might eventually be brought about by an exact manipulation
of
sanctions.^
I

would note at this point that if it can be proven that the

forced pursuit of general happiness is nevertheless of distinct
moral worth, then it would appear that the principle which results
is based upon a definition of morality as both the agathistic good

and the hedonistic good combined into one.

For utilitarianism is

not, except with this merger, a form of hedonistic good.

Otherwise

it is based on intuition, not interest.

SECTION

3.

To prove that utilitarianism is moral is, says Bentham,

unnecessary and impossible, for what is used to prove every tiling
else cannot be itself proved.

Nevertheless, he does give a sort of

proof in the first page of his work ’’Nature lias placed mankind under the governance of two

sovereign masters, pain and pleasure . It is for them alone
to point out what we ought to do as well as to determine what
we shall do... The principle of utility recognizes this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of the system...”^

See Sidgwick.
6.
Readers , p. 233*

Outlines of the History of Ethics for English

Introduction to the Principles of liorals and Legislation ,
7.
p. 125.
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Thie method of proving utilitarianism (or showing
that it needs

no proof) relies on what is called psychological
hedonism.

Accord-

ing to psychological hedonism it is a fact that men
do pursue only

pleasure and the avoidance of pain.

Psychological hedonism is

thus distinguished from ethical hedonism which is the
doctrine

merely that men ought to pursue only pleasure and avoidance
of pain.

Bentham claims that both doctrines are true without explicitly indicating that one proves the other.

J.

S. Mill, as

we shall

shortly see, explicitly holds that psychological hedonism proves
ethical hedonism.

proof occurs.

He indicates two different ways in which this

The most cogent of these may have been that which

Bentham also had in mind.

Mill argues that if man does in fact

pursue only pleasure, then this must include what he ought to
pursue, since moral conduct is a part of conduct in general.

Psychological hedonism occurs in two forms and it is sometimes
difficult to determine which of them a thinker means, or whether

he confuses the two and uses them both interchangeably.

In both

forms, this doctrine actually seems to have implications not only

for the principles of morality but, even more, for the very de-

fining of it.

Since Bentham’ s concern with moral principles is

very closely related to his concern with defining morality,

I

want

to indicate here what these implications are.

The difference between the two forms of psychological hedonism
is based on a difference in the definition of pleasure.

What may

be called the logical form defines pleasure as whatever a person

desires and is certainly true because tautological.

If a martyr

)
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chooses to go to the stake he must
ultimately have wonted to do so

and if pleasure is defined as whatever
he wants, then the stake

must be, in this sense, pleasurable.

As was mentioned in Chapter I,

this first definition of pleasure is
applicable to interest ethics.

Consequently the logical form of psychological
hedonism, if it
proves anything at all, proves that the definition
of morality is

interest— not the hedonistic good.
tiiat

(Of course it would not seem

a tautology could really prove anything.

The second form of psychological hedonism, which
may be called
empirical, defines pleasure not as desire but as the
satisfaction

of desire.

It is not true by definition, as it is with the logical

form, that men pursue only the satisfaction of desire.

doctrine is true it must be so by empirical evidence.

If this

Nevertheless,

it is this form which, if true, would prove that morality is the

hedonistic good.
It is not clear whether the psychological hedonism which

Bentham uses as a proof of utilitarianism is of the empirical or
the logical form.

On the one hand, he considers pleasure as a goal

to be pursued and in that case his psychological hedonism would

seem empirical.

For one would not be likely to pursue mere desire

but rather the satisfaction of desire.

Furthermore, Bentham implies

that the pursuit of pleasure is a meaningfully moral obligation

— he

olaims to be writing a work about what ought to be and not merely

what is.

Further still, Bentham states, with disapproval, that

when a person claims to be basing his actions on some duty, he is
really simply basing them on whatever he feels like doing and then
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calling that a duty.

Thus Bentham seems to deny interest
ethics,

in which case he presumably would not he
using the form of

psychological hedonism which assumes such ethics*
On the other hand, Bentham’ a comments when
he comes to

explicitly define morality suggest that, after all,
it is the
logical form of psychological hedonism that he has
in mind.

Ac-

cording to him utilitarianism is not only moral but the
very defi-

nition of morality!
'Of an action that is conformable to the principle
of
utility one may always say either that it is one that ought
to be done, or at least that it is not one that ought not to
be done... When thus interpreted, the words ought, and right
and wrong, and others of that stamp, have a meaning: when
otherwise they have none.' ®
1

To put it another way, seeking the greatest happiness of the

greatest number is moral (i.e. seeking the greatest happiness of
the greatest number)

.

This is a mere tautology.

How since, for

Bentham, seeking the greatest happiness of the greatest number is,

or is made, the most effective way to seek one’s own happiness it
would seem that the tautologous nature of utilitarianism was related to a similarly tautologous kind of egoistic hedonism.

Such

a hedonism would be established by the logical form of psychological hedonism, which is that one cannot desire anything other than

what one desires.

Another indication that it is the logical form of psychological hedonism which Bentham uses is his criticism of all duties.

He claims that there are no absolute duties.

8.

Ibid,, p. 127.

Yet according to the

b
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explanation of an ethics of good in Chapter
I, any "good" must be
in a sense, absolute and independent of
interest.

It is the logical

form of psychological hedonism which establishes
pure interest
ethics.

Insofar as the nature of Bentham

’

psychological hedonism is

unclear, hie definition of morality is also unclear as
are also the

problems accompanying it.

It is certain, however, that he does

not define morality as the right.

Indeed it is the criticism of

that definition whioh constitutes his principal negative proof of

utilitarianism.

SECTION 4.

If utilitarianism is right, says Bentham, then to show

that other principles are wrong, all one needs do is to show that

they differ.

Nevertheless he does somewhat more than this and thus

his comments here do contribute to his proof.

other principles

— that

He distinguishes two

of "asceticism" and that of "sympathy and

antipathy" •

According to Bentham, asceticism is the exaot opposite of
utilitarianism.

It approves those actions whioh increase pain and

decrease pleasure.

It has never been consistently pursued, notes

Bentham, and if it was so pursued by any substantial number of

people it would turn the world into a hell.

Perhaps more significant than asceticism, whioh seems to me
an almost purely theoretical construct, is the principle which holds
that the approval of an action is its own justification and does

not depend on any resultant increase or decrease of happiness.

As
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Ben thorn defines it, this principle is equivalent
to both duty and
interest ethics.
It

-was

indicated in Chapter I that a very sharp distinction

is usually made between interest ethics and duty
ethics (the ethics

of right) .

Duty ethics holds not only that what you ought to do

is not simply what you want to do but further that
duty in general

should be done for its own sake and not because you want to do
it.

Bentham denies this distinction and considers that duty ethics is

really nothing but concealed interest ethics despite others of his
statements which suggest that he himself agrees with interest
ethics.

His reason for equating duty and interest seems to rest

on the observation that moral systems vary greatly as to their

standards of right and it appears therefore that the standards

which they hold absolute must simply be their own preferences.

Bentham concludes, therefore, that the principle of sympathy and
antipathy is really the negation of all principle.
It will be noted that this criticism of an ethics of right is

not the same as that given in the introduction.

Bentham’ s oriti-

oism rests on the assumption that what is a duty for one must be

a duty for all and that what is a duty at one moment must be so at
the pext.

Denying this assumption, as some contemporary thinkers

such as Karl Barth do, seems to involve no immediate logical con-

tradictions however.

Of course there may be practical difficulties

as when one person's performance of his duty interferes with an-

other's performance of his.
One could not expect Bentham to criticize an ethics of right
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for its denial of free will since he himself
seems to do the same,

claiming that moral action is based on natural
necessity.
difficulty

the denial of free will

— is

This

nevertheless still there.

At any rate, Bentham concludes from his discussion
that
asceticism is self-defeating, sympathy and antipathy is not
a
principle at all and we are left with utilitarianism as the only

right principle to be governed by.

SECTION
ciple.

ft.

Bentham holds that utilitarianism is a workable prin-

It is not easy to

apply— indeed there are considerable

practical difficulties but there are (apparently) no logical con-

tradictions for him.

To achieve the greatest happiness one must

measure and compare pleasures.

Each pleasure or pain considered

by itself must be measured for its intensity, duration, certainty
or uncertainty and propinquity or remoteness.

The act which pro-

duces the feeling must be measured for fecundity— its likelihood
to produce more of the same, for

purity— its likelihood not to

produce the opposite, and for extent— the number of persons who
are affected by it.

To determine whether the tendency of any par-

ticular act is good or bad one merely sums up, using the above
measurements, the values of eaoh pleasure and each pain which

appears to be produced by the act.

If the balance is on the side

of pleasure, then the aot has a good tendency; if not, it has a

bad one.

This balance can be determined for every individual

affected by the act or for the community as a whole.
In the latter case one sums up the degrees of good tendency

37 -

for each individual for whom the act is good
on the whole.

One

does the same with the degrees of had tendency
for those indi-

viduals fo r whom the act is had on the whole.

One then suhstracts

the total degrees of had tendency from the total
degrees of good

tendency to find the balance for the community as a
whole.
It Is not to he expected, says Bentham, that this process
will

he strictly followed prior to every moral judgment, but it may
he

kept in

vie?/

possible.

and should (presumably) he applied as closely as

Indeed it is such a process that men customarily employ

in deciding what to do.

SECT1QU 6

.

I have indicated

to utilitarianism.

I

briefly how Bentham reduces morality

have considered both his definition of

morality and his attempt to show that only utilitarianism is moral,
though the latter seems, according to some statements, to involve

a different definition of morality.

I have also considered both

the positive and negative aspects of his proof.

We must now dis-

cuss these same elements in the utilitarianism of J. S. Mill.

Bentham meant by utility the greatest happiness of the greatest number, but he also meant the greatest happiness of each indi-

vidual and apparently assumed that the two could be reconciled.

Mill explicitly states thatt
"...the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of
what is right in conduct is not the agent's own happiness,
but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and
that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be strictly
impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator."^

9.

Utilitarianism , p. 24
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Mill too, however, seems to assume that
the general happiness

and the agent's own happiness can he fairly
easily reconciled.

He

believes, as does Bentham, that enticing or
forcing a person to

pursue the utilitarian goal does not destroy the
morality of such
pursuit.

And he has his own reasons for expounding, much
like

Bentham, the even holder doctrine that man naturally
gets most

individual pleasure hy pursuing the general pleasure.

According

to him, man' 8 concern for the general happiness is in a
sense a

natural outgrowth of his awareness of dependence on others for

satisfaction of his own desires.

SECTION 7.

Mill, like Bentham, holds that utilitarianism, as a

first principle, is incapable of proof in the ordinary sense of
the word, hut he prefers to describe this situation as one in

which a sort of proof is still possible rather than one in which
there is no proof at all.

Again like Bentham, Mill proves utilitarianism (in one way)

by a form of psychological hedonism hut he also attempts, in contrast to Bentham, to prove psychological hedonism itself.

Proof

of the latter, according to him, is possible only hy experience.
It is a question of fact to he determined hy self-observation and

the observation of others.

Thus Mill seems explicitly to state,

at least at this point, that the only form of psychological

hedonism which can he proven, if any can, is the empirical form
(for the truth of the logical form does not, of course, depend on

experience).

But he then goes on to present his belief that
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empirlcal obeervations will establish the
Identity of desire and
pleasure!
"I believe that these sources of evidence,
impartially consulted, will declare that desiring a thing
and finding it
pleasant, aversion to it and thinking of it
as painful, are
phenomena entirely inseparable, or rather two
parts of the

same phenomena} in strictness of language,
two different
modes of naming the same psychological fact.., ”7^°

If pleasure and desire are two words with the same referent,
then

they may be considered definitions of each other.

The definition

of pleasure as desire rather than satisfaction of desire
is that

upon which the logical, not the empirical, form of psychological
hedonism is based.

There are other indications also, that it is

not only the empirical form which Mill has in mind.

For example,

when he comes to explicitly define morality, he calls it a feeling
of obligation which evolves when a person recognizes that he depends upon others for satisfaction of his own desires.

Now this

seems to imply that morality is merely self interest, regardless

of how enlightened it may be.

Again it is the logical form of

psychological hedonism which would establish interest ethics.
In Mill as in Bentham, I find it difficult to determine which

form of psychological hedonism is really intended.
certain, however.

One fact seems

Whether or not Mill’s psychological hedonism

derives its cogency implicitly from the logical form, it is not

explicitly accepted as merely tautological.
If psychological hedonism is true, says Mill, then ethical

hedonism must be true.

10.

Ibid., p. 58.

If pleasure is the sole end of all human
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conduot then it mist obviously be the end
of moral oonduot since
that is merely a particular kind of conduct.
The psychological hedonism which he establishes,
Mill uses
as one proof of ethical hedonism generally.

But he has another

proof in connection with which he establishes
utilitarianism per
se (although the aspect of that second proof which
establishes

utilitarianism could be used with the first proof as well).

Mil

1

s two proofs, psychological

Of

hedonism can function independ-

ently but the other requires psychological hedonism in addition
to itself, as

’/rill

be shown.

This second proof also depends on

empirical observation.
"The only proof oapable of being given that an objeot is
visible is that people actually see it. The only proof
that a sound is audible, is that people hear it; and so
of the other sources of our experience. In like manner,
I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce
that anything is desirable is that people do actually
desire it."**

In other words the only proof there can be for the desirable, here

meaning the ultimate end or what ought to be desired, is that it
is in fact desired.

Now Mill establishes, by his psychological

hedonism, that the only thing which is in fact desired is the indi-

vidual’s own happiness and the immediate inference from this would
be that that is the only thing that ought to be desired (which is
the position of egoism).
alone.

Mill, however does not draw this inference

Concerning utilitarianism, which is after all what he in-

tends to prove, he states that!

11.

Ibid., pp. 52-3*
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S V6n
7 he gener&1 ^PPiness is desirable,
Zl
* nt that each
l person, so far
except
as he believes it to be attain!
able, desires his own happiness. This
however, being a fact,
we have not only all the proof which the
case admits of, but
all which it is possible to require,
that happiness is a good,
that each person's happiness is a good to
that person, and the
general hanpmess, therefore, a good to the
aggregate of all
persons.
Mill's argument restated seems to be:
a.

the individual desires only his own pleasure,

b.

the pleasure of the aggregate of individuals is
therefore

desired,
c.

the pleasure of the aggregate of individuals therefore

ought to be desired,
d.

the individual ought to desire the aggregate pleasure.

In the argument, Mill apparently means by "desirable" both

what ought to be desired and what is desired, otherwise
not follow from b.

c.

does

It also appears that d. does not follow from c.

but this point we will consider later.
The ambiguity in the meaning of desirable functions as Mill's

other proof but it does not establish ethical hedonism unless what
is in fact desired is only pleasure.

In other words, it requires

psychological hedonism in addition to itself.

We may conclude that there are, for Mill, two positive proofs
of ethical hedonism generally, one of which functions independently

while the other does not.

Propositions a. through c. can be es-

tablished by either one of the two.
be established as follows:

12.

Ibid., p. 53.

By the first proof they would

—

i
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Deaire and pleasure are identical— therefore
propositions
a. and b. are true;

If pleasure is the sole end of all human
conduct, then it must

be the end of moral oonduct which is merely a
particular kind
of conduct

— therefore

proposition

c.

is true.

By the second proof these propositions would be
established as
follows

Desire and pleasure are identical— therefore propositions a.
and b. are true.
The only proof that anything is desirable (meaning apparently,

Both worthy of desire and desired) is that it is desired—
therefore proposition c. is true.

There is, in addition to the two proofs of ethical hedonism generally, a single proof for utilitarianism per se which is used by

Mill in connection with the second proof but could, it seems, be

used with the first, instead.
Of these three proofs Bentham also appears to have used one

namely the first of the two proofs for ethical hedonism in general.
As cumbersome and dubious as these proofs may themselves appear
to be, one must keep in mind the further difficulty that both of the

proofs for ethical hedonism in general

are based on a psychological

hedonism which has not been clearly defined.

SECTION 8 .

Both Bentham and Mill seem to be more explicitly and

thoroughly concerned with establishing the proposition that only

utilitarianism is moral than they are with establishing a definition
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of morality in the first place.

For, when it cornea to the negative

aspect of proof— the discrediting of all
definition of morality

other than that on which utilitarianism ia
based, there is only
one definition which they completely and
clearly oppose.

That is

the ethics of right.

Both thinkers believe that by a manipulation of
reward and
punishment a man oan be made to get most individual
pleasure by

pursuing the general pleasure.

They further believe that this use

of sanctions does not destroy the distinct moral worth of
the

general pleasure.

As was previously noted, this position would

seem to imply a merger of the agathistio and the hedonistic good.

Neither thinker makes clear which type of psychological
hedonism he is using as a proof of utilitarianism.

Since only one

type is applicable to the hedonistic good while the other is appli-

cable to interest ethics, there is no clear opposition to interest
ethics either.
Mill, like Bentham, does clearly oppose the ethics of right.

According to Mill, there is only one moral principle, besides
utilitarianism, which appears in any way to be a really distinct
and independent principle.

This principle is justice.

Justice,

however, only appears to be a distinct principle but is not actually
so; for it provides no means of reconciling different views as to

what exactly is just.
"Not only have different nations and individuals different
notions of justice, but in the mind of one and the same
individual, justice is not some one rule, principle, or maxim,
but many, which do not always coincide in their dictates,
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and in choosing between which, he is
guided either by some
extraneous standard, or by his own personal
predilections." 1 ^
This appears to be a pivotal argument, not
only for Mill but also

for Bentham (and to some extent, for Sidgwiok
as well).
it

We find

in Bentham in his criticism of the so-called
principle of

sympathy and antipathy where he concluded that moral
rules are

really nothing but personal preferences.
illll,

As with Bentham, so with

this criticism seems to be primarily practical in
nature.

Proponents of the right can easily explain how an individual
ohooses

between conflicting duties.

He does so by a "higher" duty.

An in-

finite regress of duties seems, of course, to imply a lack of free

will but Mill does not seem to be any more concerned with free will
than Bentham was.

It is not this logical difficulty of the right

upon which he bases his critioiam.
For Mill, the only way to reconcile the various contradictory
notions of justice is to submit them to the utilitarian standard.
Indeed, says he, the only reason that justice appears to be inde-

pendent of utility in the first place is because it is concerned

with the broadest and strongest interest of

man—namely

his security.

The sentiment of justice has developed out of what are, or resemble,
two natural instincts

— that

of self-defence and that of sympathy.

These become the desire to punish one who does harm and the belief
that there is a definite individual to whom harm has been done.

These standards are so necessary to us that we come to think of
them as absolute though they are not.

13.

Ibid., p. 82.
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SECTI£N_2.

workable.

Mill, like Bentham, believes that
utilitarianism is

He argues that the complications involved
in measuring

pleasure are not overwhelming.

To assess the consequences of an

action there is the whole past experience of
mankind.

Mil

differs from Bentham very sharply in one
respect.

In

defending utilitarianism against those who call it a
doctrine

worthy only of swine, Mill claims that it is perfectly
consistent

with the doctrine to recognize distinctions in the quality
of
pleasure as well as distinctions in quantity.

The test of whether

one pleasure is higher than another is whether or not all or
most

of those who have experience of both prefer the one to the other

regardless of any feeling of obligation to do so.

Now a test of

this sort, having no criterion independent of simple desire, except
the proviso that it be a general desire, would not seem to be

measuring differences in quality but rather those differences in
quantity which need considerable experience to discover.

It would

seem to be measuring, in other words, what Bentham called the
fecundity, purity and extent of an act.

We cannot, however, infer merely from the nature of his

measuring tool, that Mill does not really support distinctions in
quality.

He explicitly notes the tendency of utilitarians to sup-

port what amount to distinctions in quality, but on quantitative
considerations, and states that it is possible to do more than this.

Furthermore, a subsequent discussion of this issue further develops
just such a position.

••
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In this discussion, Mill holds that
it is perfectly possible
to pursue an end such as virtue or
health for its own sake and not

merely as a means to pleasure.

Whatever is bo pursued is not then

a means to the utilitarian end because it is,
instead, a part of
that end.

Money, which is initially desired only as a
means to

pleasure, may in time become desired for its own sake
and the same
is true of most of the great objects of human life.

is difficult to make clear.

This argument

However, to say that happiness, as the

only ultimate end, can have parts which are not quantitative but
qualitative merely seems to draw out a special implication of the
initial belief in qualitative differences among pleasures.

Since Mill admits qualitative as well as quantitative differences, he must have some other technique for determining moral action

as well as measurement of pleasure.

There is difference of opinion

as to what this other technique is.

Sidgwiok apparently understands him to mean that the avoidance

of harm to others is the primary specific rule which a utilitarian
should follow.

Anschutz, in one of the few even partially definitive
1

works on Mill,

A

considers that it is self-realization (defined in

several different ways) that Mill presents as the specific goal of

morality.

Sidgwick*s position (to be considered later) that qualitative

distinctions in pleasure are fatal to utilitarianism seems to me a

valid one.

14.

I do not therefore plan to discuss the elements of

R. P. Anschutz, The Philosophy of J. S. Mill . PP. 18-19, 22-7.
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self-realization ethics in Mill since these
definitely seen to
involve criteria other than pleasure.

Concerning the rule about

refraining from harm, Mill does make this a
principal part of his
doctrine so far as one's relations with others
are concerned, thou^i
it does not give any guidance for purely
private morality.

In his

work On Liberty we find that*
"The object of this Essay is to assert one very
simple principle as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings
of society
with the individtial in the way of compulsion and
control...
That principle is, that the sole end for which
mankind are
warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering
with
the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-"
protection, "*5

Mill states that this principle is not an absolute principle,
in
the way that duty ethics would have it, but is grounded on
the per-

manent interests of man, that is, on utility.

SECTION 10 .

We have now considered the principal elements involved

in the attempts of the two major utilitarians prior to Sldgwick, to

reduce ethics to the greatest happiness principle.

It only remains

to comment briefly on the utilitarianism of Herbert Spencer.

Spencer,

in his later six- volume work on ethics, does not understand utili-

tarianism exactly as do Bentham and Mill.

He does consider it to

mean the greatest happiness of the greatest number but for him greatest
here signifies complete happiness.

This will beoome clearer as we

show how he proves utilitarianism.
Like that of Bentham and Mill, Spencer's proof can be said to

be based on psychological hedonism.

15*

J.

S. Mill,

On Liberty ,

p.

9*

Spencer does not however claim
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as do the others, that psychological
hedonism is the state of

things right now but rather that it will
be, in the perfectly

evolved society of the future.

Spencer repeats the observation

of the earlier thinkers that moral
conduct is merely a part of

conduct in general and then goes on to say
that conduct depends
on the stage of evolution (which is always
a progression from
the worse to the better).

How we call life good, says Spencer,

only because it is, on the whole pleasurable.

Yet in an im-

perfectly evolved society we can only preserve life by encroaching on the life and pleasure of others.

We find, however, by

studying what is common to the various aspects of conduct that
the evolutionary tendency is toward a state in which each in-

dividual’s own perfect pleasure will naturally be achieved in
those actions which provide the perfect pleasure of every other
individual.

Since this is what will be, it includes what ought

to be, says Spencer.

Utilitarianism is the only ethical principle that recognizes
natural causation (i.e. evolution) according to Spencer.

All

other systems ignore natural right and reduce morality to pure
caprice,

nevertheless, the utilitarian end cannot be achieved

directly by the measuring system of Bentham.

In the present im-

perfect state of evolution, we can only approximate it by obeying

certain general rules which, although they are based on interest,

have in one case at least, almost the foroe of a duty completely
independent of interest.

- 49 -

—

TIQH 11 *

Bentham, Mill and, to a leaser extent,
Spencer were

all proponents of the later form of
utilitarianism.

will be shown, inclined to the earlier
form.

Sidgwick, as

But there is one very

important respect in which all of these
thinkers seem alike.

In

their attempts to reduce morality to utilitarianism,
none of them
seems willing to clearly discredit more than one
of the four dif-

ferent definitions of morality.

Bentham, Mill and Spencer explic-

itly denounce the ethics of right.

Sidgwick, we shall find,

explicitly denounces the ethics of interest.

Beyond this, however,

they do not seem to go.
It is within this context that Sidgwick takes his departure

from the latter form of utilitarianism

—particularly

that of Mill.

Bentham, Mill and Spencer all understood utilitarianism rather
loosely, as they all anticipated, with more or less confidence, a
time when the pursuit of general happiness would also be the best

way to achieve one’s own.

In so doing they seemed to presuppose

a merger of the agathistic and hedonistic good.

Sidgwick also

hoped that utilitarianism and egoistic hedonism could be reconciled
but he was far less confident of this.

When they came to prove their rather loosely defined utilitarianism, Sidgwick’ s predecessors relied on some variant of

psychological hedonism.

Only one of the two forms of psychological

hedonism is applicable to the hedonistic good however, while the
other is applicable only to interest ethics.

Consequently, there

seemed to be no clear opposition to interest ethics any more than
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there was to either form of good.
the root of both proofs.

Indeed interest seemed to he at

For even the empirical form of psycho-

logical hedonism consisted merely of a
statement of people's wants.

Sidgwick developed a position almost at
the opposite pole

from that of his predecessors.

For him, the proof of utilitarianism

was based ultimately on the right although,
like them, he also seemed
to accept both forms of the good as well.

Of Sidgwick' s predecessors, Mill and especially
Bentham believed in the measurement of pleasures as a means of
achieving the
general happiness.

Sidgwick severely critioized the effectiveness

of such a process and tried to re-establish the earlier
position
that obedience to duty was the best means of achieving the utili-

tarian end.

CHAPTER IV
SIDGWICK' S PROOF OF UTILITARIANISM - NEGATIVE ASPECTS

SECTION 1 .

I have considered two of the major and one of the minor

exponents of the later utilitarianism.

In my exposition of their

arguments I have already suggested oertain criticisms of them.

It

should he noted, however, that no one of these three men was a

philosopher by profession and the two major exponents, at least,

were almost more concerned with the practical applications of utilitarianism than they were with its theoretical adequacy.

When we

oome to Sidgwiok, the situation is different.

Educated at Cambridge University, Sidgwick spent virtually
the rest of his life there, first as an instructor in classics,

then later as a professor of philosophy.

In the very first years

of teaching, immediately after completing his formal education, he

began a study of J. S. Mill, and his first adherenoe to any definite
ethical system was to Mill's utilitarianism.

But Sidgwick was, as

he himself explicitly stated, deeply concerned with the theoretical
problems of ethics generally and consequently with those of any

system to whioh he adhered.

—

.
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Illustrative of Sidgwiok' s concern for
theoretical
problems
1
are the two somewhat different purposes
whioh he gives for his

ethical thought.

One of these is to make an impartial
investi-

gation of all the really distinct moral
systems.

This is the

avowed purpose of the work The Methods of Ethics

in which his

thought is developed.
to utilitarianism.

The second purpose is to reduce morality

This is the purpose probably credited to him

most often and is what he seems to indicate in his
own description of the development of his thought.

An explicit statement of the first purpose is found in
the

preface of the first edition and is amplified in the first chapter
of the work.

Sidgwiok states in the preface that the purpose of

the Methods is primarily the exposition of the various existing

—not

systems of morality

a reduction to any particular one of them.

M

It claims to be an examination, at once expository and critical, of the different methods of obtaining reasoned convictions as to what ought to be done whioh are to be found
either explicit or implicit— in the moral consciousness of
mankind general lyt and which from time to time, have been
developed. . . by individual thinkers . .

Sidgwiok goes on, in Chapter 1, to say that the purpose of
this exposition is to reveal, in a purely disinterested manner,
the difficulties of each of these methods.

The Methods of Ethics was Sidgwiok' s first major work and was
first published in 1874* It represents generally the position he
retained throughout his life. He revised this work four times the
second through the fifth editions and was in the prooess of revising
the sixth (l^Ol) at the time of his death. It is generally held that
the revisions did not substantially alter the arguments of the work.
Consequently, my study is based almost exclusively on the sixth edition
and quotations are from that edition.
1.

—

2.

The Methods of Ethics , p. 4*

—

- 53 -

ethical treatises. . .there has been a continual
tendency
to ignore and keep out of sight the
difficulties of the subject; either unconsciously ... or consciously
that he [the
writerj may not shake the sway of morality
over the minds

of his readers. This last well-meant precaution
frequently
defeats itself j the difficulties thus concealed
in exposition are likely to reappear in controversy; and
then they
appear not carefully limited, but magnified for
polemical
purposes... To eliminate or reduce this indefiniteness
and
confusion is the sole immediate end that I have
proposed to
myself in the present work. In order better to execute
this
task, I have refrained from expressly attempting any
such
complete and final solution of the chief ethical difficulties
and controversies as would convert this exposition of various
methods into the development of a harmonious system. At the
same time I hope to afford aid to the construction of such
a
system. • ."2

Perhaps the strongest explicit statement of this first purpose
is found in the preface to the second edition where Sidgwick makes

the following remark*
"I find that more than one critic has overlooked or disregarded
the account of the plan of my treatise. . .and has consequently
supposed me to be writing as an assailant of two of the methods
I chiefly examine, and a defender of the third... I am concerned to have caused so much misdirection of criticism. "4

Despite these explicit statements of a primary concern to expose various systems rather than to reduce them to a single one,

Sidgwick indicates, at other places, great concern with this second
The preface to the sixth edition contains a description

purpose.

of the development of his thought.

In this he indicates how he

came to believe that duty ethics was implicitly utilitarian but

"slowly and reluctantly" concluded that utilitarianism and egoistic

hedonism could not be reconciled.

3*

Ibid.

4.

Ibid., p. x.

,

p.

3*

In the conclusion of the Methods
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he states that he has -failed" to provide
a harmonious system.
These two statements, among others, seem
a hit strong if the pro-

duction of a harmonious system was only incidental
to his main
purpose in the first place.

The strongest indication of Sidgwiok'e second
puri)Ose is,
however, not something he himself explicitly says.

The fact is

that he does not impartially consider all the really
distinct moral

systems and he does believe that he has reduced two of those
which

he does consider to each other.

These points will he amplified

subsequently.

oidgwick s two purposes may be said to make up a more general
f

purpo 8e—hopefully to reduce morality to utilitarianism but to do
so with complete fairness and thus without having to discredit, or

deny the distinctiveness of, all other moral systems.

SECTION 2 .

The very organization of his work, and its title, re-

flect Sidgwick* s general purpose although they, perhaps, cause a

little confusion.

For example, it may seem strange to write a book

on "methods" of ethics rather than on duties or the good.

Aotually,

this term "methods" and its plural use indicates Sidgwick's desire

for fairness to all distinct moral systems.

He uses the term in

two senses~a wider and a narrower one (though he does not explic-

itly describe them so).
The wider method determines which narrower method or methods
of ethics are correct .

Now two of the narrower methods which

Sidgwick recognizes are what I have called definitions of morality.

—
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Por Sidgwick, however, they are different
narrower methods based
on the same definition.

He distinguishes between the right and

the good but not as different definitions of
morality—merely as

different narrower methods based on a single definition—
which
turns out to be the right again.

Consequently there is only one

wider method and this is intuition.^
To understand the meaning of Sidgwick* a narrower method,
we

must realize that no matter whether a moral standard applies to
acts or consequences, it is always the morality of the aot with

which we are ultimately concerned.

Sidgwick* s narrower method

means, roughly, how we determine the moral act.

As noted above

the narrower method is conceived almost as what I would call the

definition itself , since a definition of morality is basically a
statement as to how the morality of the act is determined.
I note that Sidgwick

(Again

himself does not consider his different methods

to be different definitions.)

If morality is the right, then the moral act is determined by
the "method” of direct intuition.

If morality is the good, then

the moral act is determined by the "method” of evaluating conse-

quences.

This way of describing different systems (definitions)

gives, in effect, a practical focus to the difficulties of them

namely, their workability.

A primary concern with the narrower method is indicated by
the organization of Sidgwick *s work and the plural form of the word

Much of this chapter and the following will be devoted to
5.
amplifying these points.
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method used in the title.

Indeed, more than half of the
500 pages

are devoted to this practical focus.

Nevertheless, his discussion

of the va lidity of these narrower methods,
while briefer, is of
equal importance,

(in subsequent discussion I shall, for
simplicity,

refer to the narrower methods merely as methods.)
Like Bentham and Mill, Sidgwick does not, in effect,
clearly

discredit all the definitions of morality other than
that on which

utilitarianism is based.

On the contrary, while his predecessors

did not openly admit that the three definitions they retained
might

be distinct from and opposed to each other, Sidgwick (though not
considering them definitions) does admit this with respeot to two
of the three but not the third.

called interest ethics.

He clearly opposes what

I

have

He does, however, recognize both the right

and the good but does not clearly distinguish between the hedonistic
(in the strict sense of the term) and the agathistic good.

The distinction between the right and the good accounts roughly

for two of the three methods Sidgwick discusses in his work.

How-

ever, he does not consider the good so broadly as is possible but

considers it as pleasure alone, whereas there could be other goods,
such as beauty, wisdom, health, etc.

Having claimed that pleasure is the only good^, Sidgwick goes
on to distinguish sharply between egoistic hedonism and utilitarianism.

At first glance, this distinction would seem to indicate

a distinction between the agathistic and the hedonistic good.

This

Sidgwick* 8 basis for this claim will be discussed in the next
chapter of this thesis.
6.

—
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He claims that even egoistic hedonism
is

ultimately based on an intuition and not on
self interest.

In

other words, a person ought to pursue the
satisfaction of his wants
as a matter of duty and regardless of
whether or not he wants to.

This apparently complete denial of the
hedonistic good is, however,

only apparent as subsequent discussion will
attempt to show.

The

only point I am making here is that Sidgwick's
distinction between
egoistic hedonism and utilitarianism does not indicate
a clear

explicit distinction between the agathistic and the
hedonistic good.

Sidgwick's distinctions between the right and the good, and

between egoism and utilitarianism as the only valid goods, are
the

basis for the organization of his work.

Accordingly, the Methods

of Ethics is divided into four "books"^, the first dealing with

introductory matter and the other three with the three methods he
has distinguished.

Book I is an Introduction

The Method of Egoism .

.

Book II concerns

Book III concerns the right but, since

Sidgwick speaks of different methods for determining the moral act,
he prefers to call this a method

The Method of Intuitionism .

Book

IV concerns The Method of Utilitarianism .

SECTION 3 .

The reader would expect that one of the principal

functions of Sidgwick's introductory book would be that of estab-

lishing that there are three different methods of ethics and that
there are no others.

Actually, however, most of the justification

The Methods of Ethics is a single volume work.
7.
here is equivalent in function to the term "part”.

The term "book"
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for distinguishing these three methods and
no others is contained

within the separate discussions of the methods
which are thus
justified.

It is true that there is, in the introductory
hook, a

short 12-page chapter

explicitly devoted to the question of the

number of truly distinct methods.

There are also certain other

passages in Book I 9 that have to do with this question.

But very

important aspects are referred to, and more extensively
discussed
in Books III and IV.

There are four propositions involved in Sidgwick’s attempt to
establish his three methods.

These ares

1.

Interest is by no means a method of ethics.

2.

The right and the good constitute two really distinct
methods of ethics.

5.

The good is only pleasure.

4»

Egoism and utilitarianism are also really distinct methods
of ethics

— as

distinct from each other as egoism is from

the right.

Proposition

1

.

The first proposition is the only one of the

four which is established primarily In Book I.

It is however of

very great importance as it constitutes the principal negative
aspect of Sidgwick's proof of utilitarianism.

Interest is the only

definition of morality that Sidgwick explicitly denies, just as the
right is the only definition that Bentham and Mill explicitly deny.

8.

Chapter VI, entitled "Ethical Principles and Methods"

9.

Especially in Chapter VII but also in Chapters I and VIII.

-59The latter part of this chapter is
devoted to Sidgwick ’s negative

aspect of proof.

It shows how Sidgwick refutes the
position of

Bentham and Mill that utilitarianism is ultimately
based on a
natural self-interest.

Before proceeding to these points,

I

want

to indicate the extent to which Sidgwick
does develop the other

three propositions in Book I and further, to mention
where in the

later books the more thorough discussions of them
are found.
f^pj>Q8ition 2.

Early in Chapter I of Book I Sidgwick states,

as a matter of common observation, that the ri#it and the
good are

two distinct methods of ethics and in a later chapter of
this book

he more or less reiterates this position. 10

In Chapter XIII of

Book III however, be claims to have established these two methods

by his "wider" method (which is a "wider" form of the right).

Thus

Sidgwick eventually reaches the conclusion that the distinctiveness
of the right and the good have firmer bases than that of common

acceptance and that these bases are intuitions.

Proposition

5.

With respect to the third proposition,

Sidgwick does not initially claim that the good is only pleasure.

He admits the existence of one other good which he calls perfection
of the moral agent.

But, says he, the only way we can know what

constitutes perfection is by an intuition and therefore, perfection
is not a good but a right or duty.

11
I

note here as a matter of

clarity that this argument seems to involve a denial of the agathistio

10.

The Methods of Ethioa , pp. 2-3, 7 &,

11.

Ibid., pp. 83-4*

—
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For the agathistic good is an intuition that
has made itself

a good by its "appeal" to the moral agent.

Sidgwick, however, seems

to be implying here that what the good is
cannot be established by

an intuition.
This argument, which recognizes only two goods

—pleasure

and

perfection— and then claims that perfection is not a good but a
form of right is very brief.

Chapter VI of Book I.

It occupies only a few passages in

In contrast, the entire last chapter of

Book III is also devoted, in effect, to establishing that the good
is only pleasure; but the argument there is different.

In that

chapter Sidgwick claims that the only way one can know what the
good is is by an intuition and that we know by intuition that the
good is only pleasure.

Proposition 4 .

The proposition that egoism and utilitarianism

are also clearly distinot methods of ethics remains to be considered.

Sidgwick explicitly postpones

sition until later in the work.

12

the proof of this propo-

As it happens, not until the third

chapter of the last book are the arguments clearly given (though
they are alluded to in the previous book).

Sidgwick claims, there,

that the right (the narrower right) is instinctively utilitarian
that utilitarianism is the form into which the right tends to pass.

Consequently the distinction between utilitarianism and egoism

virtually amounts to the distinction between the right and the good.
These four propositions, which I have briefly discussed here,

12.

Ibid., pp. 84 - 5 .
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are central to Sidgwick’s thought and will
be more thoroughly con-

sidered in subsequent sections of this and the
next two chapters
of this thesis.

Due to the apparent circularity of the
proofs

(they provide the basis for the classification on
which they are
in turn based) it was necessary, for clarity, to
review them at
this time.
I

have now reached the point at which to begin the main expo-

sition of Sidgwick’s own thought.

The purpose of this exposition

is to reveal the problems Sidgwick encounters in his attempt to

reduce morality to utilitarianism.

There are three sorts of

problems!
a.

The problems which he recognizes in the utilitarianism of

his predecessors, Bentham and Mill.
b.

The problems which he recognizes in his own utilitarianism.

o.

The problems in his own utilitarianism which he encounters
but does not seem to fully recognize.

The problems which Sidgwick recognizes in the utilitarianism
of Bentham and Mill are a part of the negative aspect of his own
proof of utilitarianism.

For his proof is almost directly opposite

to that of his predecessors.

These problems are discussed in the

latter part of this chapter.
The problems which Sidgwick encounters in his own proof of

utilitarianism are discussed in Chapters V and VI of the thesis.
Those chapters also indicate the solutions with which he seems to
be satisfied

—
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Ther® are oertain logioal problems which
Sidgwiok failed to
recognize in the solutions he offered.

These are discussed in

the seventh and concluding chapter of the
thesis.

S ECTION 4 .

In an early and very important chapter of his
15
work ,

Sidgwick explicitly denied that morality could be
defined as interest.

In doing so, he adopted a position almost exactly
opposite

that of his predecessors, Bentham and Mill.

Althougi neither of

these latter men showed a clear preference for any single
one of
the possible moral definitions, many of their statements
support

an interest ethics.

Bentham claimed that the only ends men in fact

sought were pleasure and avoidance of pain and these ends were,

accordingly, the only ones which they ought to seek.

The apparent

assumption that what is includes what ought to be was later made
explicit by Mill, who argued that the only proof a thing was desirable (worth desiring) was that it was in fact desired.

A pure in-

terest ethics is not, however, the same as an ethios of good and
it is an ethics of good upon which utilitarianism must be based.

Observing the tendency toward an interest ethics on the part
of Bentham and Mill, Sidgwick argues that if the pursuit of the

utilitarian end is, as they say, a matter of obligation

—a

good

then this end must itself be ultimate and not dependent on interest.

For the right cannot be reduced to interest.

refers to morality as the "right" here.)

In support of his state-

ment he examines four variants of this reduction.

15.

(Sidgwick

Book I, Chapter III. "Ethical Judgements"

According to
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the first, right means what an individual
approves hut, says

Sidgwick, if this is so, then there should
he no arguments over
rigiit or wrong.

Yet such arguments are commonplace.

The second

variant holds that right is what an individual
approves in accord

with others.
others.

But an individual can cease to he in accord
with

The objection to the first argument would
then he appli-

cable here too.

Right may however refer to public opinion apart

from individual feeling, hut we admit that some things
are right
to do though they are disapproved by the public.

The final varient—

that right is what God approves— is inapplicable to people
who do

not believe in divine retribution and the others expect retribution

because the actions are independently good or bad.

From his examination, Sidgwick concluded that the notion of
right is logically simple and cannot be analyzed.

It may have been

initially derived from interest as some thinkers (such as Mill)
hold, but that does not mean it is reducible

to interest now.

It should be noted that the arguments against interest ethics

which are presented here are different from that presented in
Chapter I of this thesis.

The argument of Chapter I was that the

definition of morality as interest makes moral statements meaningless

— i.e.

mere tautologies.

Sidgwick does mention this difficulty

but very briefly in a later chapter and as if it were so obvious as
to soaroely even merit recognition as an argument.

The arguments given above are Sidgwick’ s principal arguments
against interest and occupy the chapter in which he explicitly
claims to be discussing the definition of morality.

These four
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arguments reduce generally to this- that
right cannot be equivalent
to interest since individuals disagree
about what is right but they

do not disagree about the mere fact of
their different wants.

This

argument is very similar to that used by Bentham
and Mill to support a virtually opposite position.

For them, the disagreements

of individuals about what is right are evidence
that all so-called

duties are arbitrary, and both men seem to conclude,
at certain
points in their works, that the right is equivalent
to interest.

For Sidgwick, however, these arguments show that the source
of the
moral standard is intuition and not interest.

The concept of the good, on which utilitarianism is based,
seems to combine in some way both interest and independent values.

Bentham and Mill accept interest but do not recognize a need for
truly independent values.

The desire for a thing can by itself

make that thing independently valuable, Bays Mill.

Moreover, both

Mill and Bentham seem to hold that forcing a person to pursue something can make that thing independently valuable.
sources of obligatory power.

Sanctions are

Sidgwick, on the contrary, accepts

the independent values but does not recognize a need for interest.

He argues that recognition of a "reasonable end" (by which he seems
to mean an intuitively moral one) itself virtually provides the

"impulse” to aotion.

The adoption of an end is not a matter of

interest but one of volition.

SECTION 5 .

Sidgwick, as we see, criticizes the tendency character-

istic of his two predecessors to define morality as interest.

He
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also criticizes their further position that the
only object in which

man in fact has an interest is happiness. 14

it will he recalled

that this latter position is called psychological
hedonism.
I

indicated in the previous chapter that there are two
forms

of psychological hedonism~the logical and the empirical—
and that

neither Mill nor Bentham make clear which form they use.
forms the logical form is tautological.

Of the two

What this means is that it

is, in a strict sense, not hedonistic at all hut is closer to inter-

est ethics.
to get.

It claims that what you want to get is what you want

Hedonism, however, claims that what you want to get is the

satisfaction of your want.

could establish this.

Only empirical psychological hedonism

Sidgwick, however, shows, using the famous

argument of Butler and Hume, that the empirical form is logioally
impossible.

Sidgwick first observes that psychological hedonism is often

used to support egoistic hedonism but that even if psychological
hedonism is true, it does not necessarily provide such support.

It

may simply be that whatever people recognize as their duty is in
fact what they enjoy doing, and not that this enjoyment is itself

what they ought to seek.

Of course, if instead of defining psycho-

logical hedonism in terms of pleasure alone we define it in terms

of greatest pleasure, then obviously a man who by nature can seek

only greatest pleasure, cannot by obligation seek anything else.
In this case however obligation becomes meaningless.

14.

Book I, Chapter IV. “Pleasure and Desire*’.

—
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But is psychological hedonism true?

Hill’s equating of pleasure and desire

Sidgwick observes that

may;

lead to the logical, but

tautological, form of psychological hedonism.

He concludes, however,

that we must understand Mill to be, in reality,
talking about the

empirical form when he says that psychological hedonism
is so obvious as to hardly be disputed.

Then he brings forward Butler’s

argument that there must necessarily be desires other than
for
pleasure.

This earlier English moralist holds that there are "par-

ticular movements" to external objects, suoh as honor, power, etc.,

which can be said to be interested only in the sense that every
movement of a creature is interested.

These movements are presup-

posed by the idea of a pursuit of interest.

Sidgwick, summarizing

the argument, states that "we could not pursue pleasure at all,

unless we had desires for something else than pleasure; for pleasure
consists in the satisfaction of just these ’disinterested’ impulses." 1 ^

Now this argument, which we have previously considered in
Chapter II, seems to be simply a variant of the logical criticism
of the hedonistic good.

It appears therefore to have logical cogency

that is it appears as convincing as the statement "if equals are

added to equals the results are equal”.

Sidgwick tends to interpret

its cogency as a product of empirical investigation and not therefore

absolute.

"Butler has certainly over-stated his case, so far as my own
experience goes; for many pleasures. . .occur to me without any
perceptible relation to previous desires, and it seems quite

15.

The Methods of Ethics , p. 44 *
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£uncelvable

that
directed to such
f ct »
^ the appears
which
object

our primary desires might he entirely
pleasures as these. But as a matter of
to me that... I can distinguish desires
of,,
is something other than my own pleasure.*' 16

Having chosen to rest his case on empirical
findings, Sidgwick
gives a number of examples.

Hunger, according to his observation,

is a direct impulse and one example of a primary
desire.

In this

case, the secondary desire for satisfaction may seem
somewhat diffi-

cult to distinguish from the primary one.

However, if we consider

the pleasure we get not purely from attaining something, as
is the

case with hunger, but mainly from the pursuit of it, then it is

clear that we do first pursue it.

Once we are pursuing it, we be-

come interested in it, and may at that point desire the pleasure of

attaining it.
In the case of pleasures of pursuit, the distinction between

these primary and secondary desires (or as Sidgwick prefers to call

them— extra-regarding and self-regarding impulses) is further
accentuated by the fact that they tend to conflict with each other.
M

A man who maintains throughout an epicurean mood, keeping
his main conscious aim perpetually fixed on his own pleasure,
does not catch the full spirit of the chase... Here comes
into view the fundamental paradox of Hedonism, that the
, ^
impulse of pleasure if too predominant, defeats its own aim."
1

Nevertheless, says Sidgwick, the conflict between the two kinds

of impulses is not absolute and man's greatest happiness, if this
be his goal, is usually attained by a sort of alternating rhythm of
the two,

Sidgwiok concludes that we certainly do not always have

16.

Ibid., pp. 44-5*

17.

Ibid., p. 48.

.
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impulses toward pleasure.

Psychological hedonism is false.

however sometimes have impulses toward pleasure.

We do

The possibility

remains of validating both egoism and utilitarianism
provided that
some better means can be found for doing so.

In the next chapter

we shall consider Sidgwiok’s reliance upon intuition
for this
purpose.

SECTION 6.

Having presented his arguments against psychological

hedonism, Sidgwick, much later in his work‘d suggests that even
,
if it were true, it would not necessarily support utilitarianism.

He pays special attention to one of Mill's arguments.

Mill had

held that*
a.

The individual can desire only his own happiness.

b.

The happiness of the aggregate of individuals therefore
ought to be desired.

c.

The individual ought, therefore, to desire the aggregate
happiness,

Sidgwick remarks, of this proof that:
"...an aggregate of actual desires, each directed towards a
different part of the general happiness, does not constitute
an actual desire for the general happiness, existing in any
individual; and Mill would certainly not contend that a
desire whioh does not exist in any individual can possibly
exist in an aggregate of individuals. There being therefore
no actual desire for the general happiness, the proposition
that the general happiness is desirable cannot be in this
way established. .
Sidgwick* 8 argument here seems quite convincing but it must

18.

Book III, Chapter XIII.

19.

Ibid., p. 588.

—

s
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be remembered that Mill and Bentham
share another position con-

nected with proof of utilitarianism.

Both men seem to feel that

the pursuit of general happiness tends to
be or can be made to be
the best way to achieve one's own.

If this statement is true then

it does seem that the acceptance of psychological
hedonism neces-

sarily involves the acceptance of utilitarianism.
ever, questions the statement's truth.

Sidgwick, how-

He observes that nowhere

in Bentham' a own works does he give a complete answer
as to how
this reconciliation of utilitarianism and egoistic hedonism
ooours.

Neither he says, does Mill show how individuals will achieve even
the best ohance at their own happiness in this life by pursuing
the

utilitarian goal.

Sidgwick thus finds difficulties with both argu-

ments by which his predecessors sought to connect utilitarianism

with psychological hedonism; and this is in addition to his view
that psychological hedonism is not valid in the first place. 20

One final point I will mention here is Sidgwick' s criticism

of Mill '8 view that there are qualitative differences among pleasures.

Sidgwick* s criticism is very brief.

21

He simply points out

I

that qualitative distinctions would have to be made on the basis

of criteria other than pleasure but for hedonism there can be no
such criteria.

If pleasure is the only ultimate end then the

The arguments, here, I have taken from another of Sidgwick’
20.
works Outlines of the History of Ethics for English Readers . The
comments are found in his exposition of Bentham and Mill, pp. 232236 .

The Methods of Sthios . pp. 120-121, 128-131; Outlines of the
21.
History of Ethics for English Headers , p. 236.
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re suits of an act cannot be measured, in
any way other than by

pleasure.

SECTION^.

When Sidgwick criticizes his utilitarian
predecessors

there are at least two difficulties which he seems
to miss.

The

first difficulty is the lack of a clear statement by
Bentham and

Mill as to which form of psychological hedonism they are
using to
prove utilitarianism.

Sidgwick states, with respect to Mill, that

we must assume Mill to use the empirical form, since the other
form
is tautologous.

However, I am not sure that we can, with fairness

to Mill, make this assumption.

It may be that Mill (and Bentham

too) vaguely hoped to have the best of both forms

— the

certainty

of the logical form with the meaningfulness of the empirical one.

The second difficulty is Mill's apparently ambiguous use of
the word desirable in his argument that the only proof that a thing
is desirable is that it is desired.

If desirable simply means

desired then this argument is true but tautologous.

If desirable

means worthy of desire then the argument is significant but not

necessarily true.

Only if the word is used ambiguously can there

even be an appearance that the argument is successful.

Sidgwick

claims, in later editions of the Methods to have noted this ambi-

guity and yet he himself seems to employ it at a critical point in
the development of his own position.

Having completed the dis-

cussion of Sidgwick' s negative aspects of proof, I shall now turn
to an exposition of that position.

CHAPTER V

THE VALIDITY OP UTILITARIANISM
SECTION 1 .

Although the very organization of Sidgwick' a work and

the proportion of it which is devoted to questions of workability

suggest a major emphasis on this faotor, Sidgwick is also con-

cerned to show the validity of his "methods” •

The primary chapters

in which he attempts this (Chapters XIII and XIV of Book III)

occupy only 34 out of the 500 pages in the work but are of much
greater importance than their proportion to the whole would indicate.
The starting point for Sidgwick' e own proof of the validity

of utilitarianism is his criticism in Book I of the proofs of

Bentham and Mill.

He argued, against their psychological hedonism,

that what is could not be a proof of what ought to be and, furthermore, pursuit of pleasure was not the only thing that existed, anyway.

As against his predecessors, Sidgwick claims that any real

obligation must be based on an intuition even when this obligation
is considered an end to be pursued (the good) rather than a duty
to be obeyed (the right).

In neither case can obligation be de-

rived from mere observation of facts.

I note, however, that
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intuition and the right are virtuall
y equivalent
so used by Sidgwick.

and are

The right is determined only by
intuitions

and moral intuitions always establish some
right, whether that

right happens to be that one ought to perform
a duty or ought to
seek an end.

In either case it means that one ought to
do some-

thing regardless of interest or consequences,
though what one
ought to do may itself involve consideration of
consequences.

Now

Sidgwick recognizes, as we mentioned, that there is
a distinction

between the right and the good and accordingly he goes on
to recognize a need for a "wider right" (wider intuitionism) as
a means of

establishing the intuitive certainty of the good.
In a very important passage of Book I, Sidgwick sets forth
this position.

He first remarks:

"I have used the term 'Intuitional* to denote the view of
ethics which regards as the practically ultimate end of
moral actions their conformity to certain rules or dictates

of ])uty unconditionally prescribed.

He then goes on to state that, while this view of ethics is
often thought to ignore consequences altogether, there is no ethics

which does not consider consequences to some extent

— for

there is

no clear point at which an act ends and consequences begin.

This

intuitional view, according to Sidgwick, is that only the Immediate

results of an act are to be considered.
"But again:", continues Sidgwick, "we have to observe that
men may and do judge remote as well as immediate results to
be in themselves good, and such as we ought to seek to realize,
without considering them in relation to the feelings of sentient

1.

The Methods of Ethics , p. 96

.

2
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beings... We have therefore to admit a wider
use of ’Intuition'
as equivalent to immediate judgement as to
what ought to be
done or aimed at.”
If hedonism is presented as an obligatory end,
then it, like

all other goods, must derive from one of these
wider intuitions.
"If Hedonism claims to give authoritative guidance,
this can
only be in virtue of the principle that pleasure is
the only
reasonable ultimate end of human action* and this principle
cannot be known by induction from experience. Experience
can
at most tell us that all men always do seek pleasure as
their
ultimate end (that it does not support this conclusion I have
already tried to show)* it cannot tell us that anyone ought
so to seek it.
If this latter proposition is legitimately
affirmed in respect either of private or of general happiness,
it must either be immediately known to be true,— and therefore,
we may say, a moral intuition or be inferred ultimately from
premises which include at least one such moral intuition;
hence either species of Hedonism, regarded from the point of
view primarily taken in this treatise, might be legitimately
said to be in a certain sense ’intuitional' .”5

—

Sldgwick reiterates his distinction between the wider and

narrower intuitionism in Book III.
”...in such maxims as that. . .justice should be done ’though
the sky should fall’, it is implied that we have the power of
seeing clearly that certain kinds of actions are right and
reasonable in themselves, apart from their consequences —or
rather with a merely partial consideration of consequences...
And such a power is claimed for the human mind by most of the
writers who have maintained the existence of moral intuitions;
I have therefore thought myself justified in treating this
claim as characteristic of the method which I distinguish as
intuitional. At the same time... there is a wider sense in
which the term ’intuitional’ might be legitimately applied to
either Egoistic or Universalistic Hedonism; so far as either
system lays down as a first principle which if known at all
must be intuitively known that happiness is the only rational
ultimate end of action. ”4
;

—

2.

Ibid., p. 97*

3.

Ibid., p. 98*

4.

Ibid., pp. 200-201.

—
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Restated briefly, Sidgwick's position is that
no hedonist
(nor a proponent of any other good) can be
completely opposed to

an ethics of right since he relies upon it to
establish that happi-

ness (or wisdom, beauty, etc.) is the ultimate end.

He does not

consider happiness to be a means to some even further
end— this

ultimate end is unconditional and not dependent on
consequences.
One would expect that the sole function of the "wider
intuitionism" would be to establish the validity of various specific
goods.

In fact, however, Sidgwick uses it to establish what almost

amounts to the general validity of the good itself.

He also uses

it to establish the validity of the narrower intuitionism.

The

narrower intuition he otherwise refers to in terms of "ordinary
intuitions" or "the morality of common sense", while the wider he

considers to involve "philosophical intuitions".

By means of philo-

sophical intuitions he claims to have established not merely various specific goods but the validity of all three of his methods

of ethics including utilitarianism.

SECTION 2 .

In accordance with his emphasis upon workability,

Sidgwick devotes most of his third book (on intuitionism) to a

discussion of what he considers practical difficulties of the narrower intuitionism.

While his discussion of the workability of

the two other methods is considered in the next chapter of this
thesis, it is important to immediately review the remarks on nar-

rower intuitions.

For these give perspective to the wider philo-

sophical intuitions which he distinguishes in the last part of the

s
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same book and upon which the various methods
are based.

At the

outset of this review I must mention a peculiarity
in Sidgwick’

very understanding of duty ethics.

There is, for him, a third

type of intuitionism in addition to ordinary intuitionism
and

philosophical intuitionism.
ism.

This third type is ultra intuition-

Ultra intuitions apply to absolutely speoific circumstances

and do not involve any reasoning process at all."*

On the other

hand, ordinary intuitions—what we usually call duty ethics— are

statements of general rules (always tell the truth, always keep
promises, etc.).

As such they involve a process of reasoning to

determine whether the rules apply in any given case. ^

This distinction between general intuitions and absolutely
specific ones may be connected with another position of Sidgwick’ s.

He maintains, as previously mentioned, that a duty ethics cannot
completely ignore consequences since there is no clear point at

which an act ends and consequences begin.

When I introduced this

point in Chapter I, I suggested that the delineation of an act from
its consequences must itself be by an intuition if a duty ethics is
to be retained.

This, however, is not exactly the position which

Sidgwick. takes.

He claims that rules of duty do not apply to the

act as such but either to the "motive" of the act or its "intention".

The intention of an act involves, for Sidgwick, all foreseen consequences.

The motive of the act also involves some consequences but

5*

Ibid., Book I, Chapter VIII, Section 2.

6.

Ibid., Book I, Chapter VIII, Section

3*

7
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which are -desired".

it seems rather unusual to re-

quire that a duty ethios consider all foreseen
consequences when
even an ethics of the good could scarcely
hope to do more than
this.

Yet Sidgwick, over the course of his argument,
considers

the workability of duty ethics as being applied
to one or the

other of these two alternatives (motives or intentions)
and he

himself considers that intentions are the most proper
objects of
rules of duty.

Given the somewhat unusual object to which Sidgwick

claims that rules of duty apply, what does he do in the analysis
of these rules?

He attempts to discover among the commonly ac-

cepted duties some which have the cogency of scientific axioms.

He

requires, among other things, that any such maxims should be truly

self evident and not conflicting with each other.

categories of duties are considered.

Three general

Duties which involve the

affections are called duties of Benevolence. ^

If we consider spe-

cific services, such as those which Benevolence requires, in terms

of their distribution, we discover the duties of Justice.
these prescribe how such services are to be distributed.

^

For

One

10.
criterion of just acts is that they do not run counter to normal

expectations.

This is the most definite criterion and is indeed

the basis for a third major category of duties— that of Laws and

7.

Ibid., Book III, Chapter X, Section 2.

There are several other categories but by far the most attention
is given to these three.

8.

9.

The Methods of Ethics , Book III, Chapter IV.
Ibid., Book III, Chapter V.
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Promises.

11

From his rather extensive analysis (over 100
pages)

of these three categories and some others, Sidgwick
draws virtually
the same conclusions about duty ethics as had
Mill and Bentham (the

latter two with far more brevity).

There is no agreement among

people as to what c onstitutes duty and, accordingly, no clearly
self evident duties

12

(at least of the narrower sort).

The nature of Sidgwick s argument is to develop various sub1

categories of his main duties and then give, for each, examples of
the common disagreements on

specific duties.

For my purposes it

would be tedious and unnecessary to present these arguments in
detail.

shall merely demonstrate his procedure by some examples.

I

In the case of duties of Benevolence, some people hold that

children should obey their parents as to choice of mate and profession.

Others say that they have no such obligation.

Again there

are those who hold that parents should sacrifice domestic to public

good while others hold the contrary.

without exception, be permanent.
exceptions.

Some say marriage should,

Others hold that there may be

One group holds that gratitude should be given in pro-

portion to services rendered.

Another claims that it should be

given in proportion to the effort of the benefactor.
Similar disagreements are found in the case of duties of
Justice.
tions.

11.

One criterion of just acts is that they fulfill expecta-

But there is disagreement as to whether tacit expectations

Ibid., Book III, Chapter VI.

Ibid., Book III, Chapter XI entitled "Review of the Morality
of Common Sense”.
12.

^
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sliould be fulfilled or only explicit ones.

Moreover, the defi-

nition of expectations depends on customs and
customs vary.
Some people hold that freedom is the only principle
of
Justice.

All aots are just except those which interfere
with

someone else’s freedom.

It is not clear however to whom the prin-

ciple of freedom applies since it cannot apply absolutely.

It

cannot apply to children, idiots, or for some, even to a lower
stage of adult civilization.

Furthermore, the principle itself

cannot be absolute since, in the pure sense, it allows any amount
of annoyance except actual constraint.
apply?

To what extent does it

Does the principle apply to property, for example?

In a

world of limited goods, the holding of property is interference.

Another view of justice is that it involves the general re-

warding of valuable deeds

j

but there is no really adequate way to

determine the value of a deed.

Market value doe3 not seem adequate

as a basis for justice and the adoption of a socialistic ideal begs
the question.

These, then, are some examples of the considerations from which

Sidgwick concludes that there is no agreement about what in fact are
duties.

There are two points about Sidgwick* s argument that might be

mentioned here.

Firstly, this argument results in

Idle

same sort of

It would seem that the nature of Sidgwick* s argument, if not
its precision, could be readily duplicated. All that is involved
is to observe the avowed moral tenets of a few different religions,
governments, civilizations, etc. Numerous disagreements even
about such basic questions as the definition of murder, will be
almost immediately evident.
13.

—
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apparently empirical rather than logical objection
to duty ethics

which Mill and Bentham raised.

It does not seem logically neces-

sary that what is a duty for one person must be so
for another,

though disagreements on duties may create practical
difficulties
if one person’s pursuit of hie duty interferes with
another’s

pursuit of his.

There is a logical difficulty of duty ethics but

that is its apparent denial of , and at the same time dependence
upon, free will.

Sidgwick however does not recognize a problem

of free will in this context.
The second point is that, surprisingly, Sidgwick’ a objection
to duty ethics is based on almost the same argument which in Book I

he used as an objection to the opposite of duty ethics
est.

— i.e.

inter-

In both cases the objections rest on the observation that

there are disagreements among people about what their duties are.

SECTION 3

-

Although Sidgwick 's argument against duty ethics is

very similar to that of Bentham and Mill, there are two important
differences.

In the first place, he suggests that while no rules

of duty (common sense morality, as he calls it) are absolute, they
are nevertheless binding more often than not.

’’...the Morality of

Common Sense may still be perfectly adequate to give practical
guidance to common people in common circumstances...”

14

This con-

cession of Sidgwick' s is one which Bentham and Mill would not be
likely to grant.
The second and crucial difference between Sidgwick' s argument

14.

The Methods of Ethics , p. 3&1.
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and that of his predecessors is that Sidgwick
does not completely

denounce duty ethics.

Although none of the narrower ordinary in-

tuitions are axiomatic, there are, for him, some
wider philosophical

ones which are.

And these wider intuitions provide the proof of

his various methods— among them utilitarianism.

In the pursuit of philosophical intuitions there are two
hazards which must he avoided, says Sidgwick.

One of these is to

so concern yourself with a particular aspect of common sense
morality

that your very discussion of it is based on an implicit acceptance

of the self same morality.

Another hazard, to which the ancient

Greeks succumbed, is the making of sham axioms which are in reality

nothing but tautologies.

Plato, for example, held that the good

life consisted in the exeroise of Virtue.

As to what conduct was

virtuous, however, he could only say that it was knowledge of the

Good and action in accordance therewith.
If the hazards are avoided, we are capable of arriving at

certain axiomatic intuitions.

SECTION A .

There are three such intuitions.

One self evident intuition is the maxim of "Justice”.

This maxim may be best stated as follows t

"It cannot be right for

A to treat B in a manner in which it would be wrong for B to treat
A, merely on the ground that they are two different individuals,

and without there being any difference between the natures or circumstances of the two whioh can be stated as a reasonable ground

for difference of treatment

15.

Ibid., p. 380.

A simpler statement of the same
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naxim would be that "...whatever action any of
us judges to be right
for himself, he implicitly judges to be right
for all similar persons in similar circumstances." 16

This positive statement of the

maxim would, however, permit sin, provided the sinner
was willing
for others to do likewise? thus the negative form is
more exact.
The maxim of Justice is obtained simply by reflection
upon the
general action of rightness as commonly conceived.

In physical

science we are forced to accept variations for which no rational

explanation can be discovered.

It is generally agreed that this

oannot be permitted in ethical judgments.

SECTION 5 .

The maxim of "Prudence" is also axiomatic.

It is that

"...Hereafter as suoh is to be regarded neither less nor more than
now*"

17

with respect to an individual’s conscious life.

It is thus

a principle recommending impartial concern for all parts of one’s
life.

The principle of Justice was derived "...by considering the
similarity of the individuals that make up a Logical Whole or
Genus.

18

There axe others, no leas important, which emerge in the

consideration of a Mathematical or Quantitative Whole.

Such a Whole

is presented in the common notion of the Good-, of any individual

human being."

19

Consequently, we see that no temporal part of the

16.

Ibid., p. 379.

17.

Ibid., p. 381.

By a Logical Whole is meant a qualitative whole— a whole of
18.
qualitatively different parts which should however be considered
on the same value level.
19.

The Methods of Ethics , pp. 380-581*

s
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good of an individual—whatever that good may

be— should

be pre-

ferred to any other merely on the basis of the time
difference
alone.

We may note that Sidgwick i8 discussing absolute rules of
right which, notwithstanding Bentham end Mill, he does believe
to
exist

— though

there are only three of them.

Nevertheless he assum es

in the maxim of Prudence and in that of Benevolence to follow that

what is right is to properly distribute the good

SECTION 6 .

.

The maxim of "Benevolence” maintains that "...eaoh one

is morally bound to regard the good of any other individual as much

as his own, except in so far as he .judges it to be less, when imon

partially viewed, or less oertainly knowable or attainable by him."
While Prudence is concerned with proper temporal distribution,
Benevolence is concerned with the spatial distribution.

21

Regarding the derivation of this maxim, Sidgwick remarks
M So

far we have only been considering the ’Good on the Whole’
of a single individual* but just as this notion is constructed
by comparison and integration of the different ’goods' that
succeed one another in the series of our conscious states, so
we have formed the notion of Universal Good by comparison and^g
integration of the goods of all individual human or sentient

—

20.

Ibid., p. 382.

This distinction between spatial and temporal distribution as
21.
a manner of describing Prudence and Benevolence is not, in its exact
terminology, employed by Sidgwick. It is used by Hayward in his book
The Ethical Philosophy of Sidgwick and is found in various places in
that work.
Some utilitarians held that the greatest happiness should be
sought only for humans. Others said that all sentient creatures
should be included. Hence the qualification here. The issue does
not seem to be very important philosophically.
22.

^

.

,
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— existences.

And here again, just as in the former case,
I
obtain the self-evident principle that the good
of any one
individual is of no more importance from the point
of view...
of the Universe, than the good of any other;
unless, that is,
there are special grounds for believing that more
good is
likely to be realized in the one case than in the
other.
And
it is evident to me that X am bound to aim at good
generally, .
not merely at a particular part of it. From these two
rational
intuitions we may deduce as a necessary inference, the maxim
of Benevolence. .
In other words, it is evident that the general good does not

repose more in one individual than any other; and it is further
evident that one should seek the general good— thus the maxim of
Benevolence.

SECTION 7

.

The existence of three self-evident maxims has been

revealed but these belong to the ethics of right, or intuitionism,
in the wider (philosophical) sense, and not

M

...in the restricted

sense whioh, for clear distinction of methods, I gave to this term
25
at the outset of our investigation.” J

These maxims being both self

evident and of the wider sort are capable of supporting an ethics

of the good as well as of right.

Hence we find that the maxim of

Prudence is implied in the commonly accepted method of egoism, the

maxim of Benevolence is implied in the method of utilitarianism,

23*

The Methods of Ethics , p. 382.

Sidgwick claims that his confidence in the axiomatic character
24 .
of his intuitions is strengthened by the fact that other moralists
have advanced somewhat similar ones. He cites Samuel Clarke’s
'rules of righteousness' and Immanuel Kant's 'categorical imperIn the first edition of the Methods Sidgwick
atives' as examples.
did not present hie maxims as direct intuitions but rather as interpretations of the intuitions of Clarke and Kant.
25*

The Methods of Ethios , p. 386.
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£md the maxim of Justice is the basis of
intuitionism.

The core-

lation between maxims and methods is not quite
that simple, however.

For Sidgwick further maintains that the maxim of
Justice "...belongs
in all its applications to Utilitarianism as much
as to any system
commonly called intuitional." 26 Although there is
virtually no

additional argument in this chapter, Sidgwiok maintains a
page later

not only that the basis of intuitionism (Justice) applies
equally
to Utilitarianism but that "Utilitarianism is thus
presented as the

final form into which intuitionism tends to pass, when the demand

for really self-evident first principles is rigorously pressed." 2 ^
Let us summarize what has been accomplished in this analysis

of the ethics of right~the method of intuitionism.

We first ob-

served that there are a narrower and wider meaning and discovered
that the narrower one was indeed subject to the inconsistencies

and incoherence which Bentham and Mill had claimed.

This narrower

meaning was furthermore that on which the initial distinction of
methods was based.

Intuitionism, in the wider sense and transcending

particular methods, did however provide three self-evident maxims.
These three maxims turned out, as it happened, to be the proof of
the three methods.

It was, moreover, discovered that the maxim of

Justice was as applicable to utilitarianism as to the narrower in-

tuitionism and it was then virtually concluded with no further
argument that these two methods were reducible

26.

Ibid., pp. 506-387.

27.

Ibid., p. 388.

to each other.
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We are thus left with two methods— egoism
and utilitarianism
(the latter including the narrower intuitionism)

We have then

.

begun to prove utilitarianism in a somewhat more
satisfactory manner
than Mill

28

was able to do, according to Sidgvick.

is not finished.

But the proof

Though a failure, Mill's proof was at least an

attempt to prove utilitarianism alone.

Here we have only managed

to reduce ethics to two conflicting principles.

Furthermore we

haven't even proved Hedonism since what the good is, which the

maxims of Prudence and Benevolence are to distribute, has not yet
been determined.

We shall consider this latter question first and

then discuss the problem of two conflicting principles.

SECTION 8 .

Before proceeding to an answer of what it is that is

good, which in the course of his argument is Sidgwick's very next

concern, let us briefly consider how he defines the good, as indicated

in an earlier chapter.

29

We find that just as his conception of the right is a bit unusual (rules of duty not only apply to consequences but to all foreseen consequences) so, in a sense, is his conception of the good.

He begins with the observation that the good cannot be defined as
pleasure, since we commonly recognize a matter of taste such that

what is pleasant may not be good.

Furthermore if the good were

defined as pleasure, then a hedonist who held that what was good

In contrasting hie own proof with that of his predecessors,
Sidgwick refers specifically to Mill's position at this point,
though a generally similar contrast could be drawn with Bentham's.
28.

29.

The Methods of Ethics , Book I, Chapter IX entitled "Good”
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wae pleasure would merely be stating a tautology.
however, be defined as a sort of desire.

The good can,

It is not what is desired,

since this might cease to be so when actually acquired
(due to

accompanying oonsequences which were not considered).

It is what

would be desired given knowledge of all alternatives and consequences.
Thus the good is, in effect, defined as desire accompanied by

perfect knowledge.

The peculiar thing about this conception of the

good, and particularly when advanced by Sidgwick, is that it almost

seems to reduce the good to interest.

For the qualification that

there be perfect knowledge seems merely to require that the interest be enlightened and enlightened interest far from being at all

different from interest per se is, on the contrary, the purest form
of it.

Yet Sidgwick takes great pains, in other parts of his work,

to show that what is good is determined not by interest but by in-

tuition.

In view of his two positions he seems to be describing the

good as a goal whioh a thoroughly knowledgeable person would want
as a matter of obligation and regardless of whether or not he wanted
it.

SECTION 9 «

Given Sidgwick' s somewhat unusual definition of the

good, what is it that he believes is the good?
30

effect are two groups^

He examines what in

of possible answers and finds that neither

of them are tenable.

The first group of answers merely leads you in a logical circle.

Sidgwick does not explicitly group these answers but he treats
them similarly.
30.

.

87-

Por ®xainple, one answer holds that the good means conformity
to
common rules of morality hut these rules are based on the
wider
intuitions and these wider intuitions merely tell one to seek
the
good.

Sidgwiok considers other answers of this sort but, as they

do not seem very controversial and have not generally been questioned

by his critics, they will not be considered here.
The conclusion to the study of the first group is that neither

virtuous character nor conduct can be called the ultimate good since
they presuppose this good.

Sidgwick then remarks:

"And what has been said of Virtue seems to be still more manifestly true of the other talents, gifts and graces which make
up the common notion of human excellence or perfection. However immediately the excellent quality of such gifts and
skills may be recognized and admired, reflection shows that
they are only valuable on account of the good or desirable
conscious life in which they are or will be actualized. .
Shall we then say that Ultimate Good is Good or Desirable conscious or sentient Life— of which Virtuous action is one element but not the sole constituent? This seems in harmony with
Common Sense..." 31

In further support of this position, Sj.dgwick notes that we cannot
attribute good to mere preservation

— for

preservation is considered

good only when accompanied by consciousness— that consciousness

which is, on the whole, desirable rather than undesirable.

More-

over, so far as virtuous activity is considered a part of the good,
it is so only because the consciousness accompanying it is desir-

able for the agent.

A virtuous life would not be good on the whole

if it involved great pain, says Sidgwick.

Tims we arrive at Sidgwick’ s second group

31.

The Methods of Ethics , pp. 395-396.

o.f

answers which is
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inclusive of all those which would propose as good something
in

isolation from "desirable consoious life".

granted that only

"

But even if it is

desirable conscious life " is the good, such a

conclusion is not adequate for utilitarianism.

In order to prove

utilitarianism (in its usual meaning) Sidgwick should instead prove
that ultimate good is pleasure .

pleasure identical?

Are desirable consciousness and

Only if they are has he succeeded.

Now there

are, in consciousness, cognitions and volitions as well as feelings.

The desirability of feelings cannot be measured by any other standard than individual pleasure so here, at least, the two notions are
identical.

What of cognitions and volitions?

Sidgwick claims that

we will find on reflection that if we distinguish these cognitions
and volitions from the feelings that accompany them and from the
objective relations (such as in cognition prompt us to speak of
truth or falsity) they are neither desirable nor undesirable but
are completely neutral.

(I shall consider this matter of objec-

tive relations in the following section.)

What is accomplished by

this abstraction of feelings from the cognitions and volitions they

accompany?

Briefly stated, Sidgwick’ s argument concerning whether

desirable consciousness and pleasure are identical seems to result
in the following;
a.

— is

One element of desirable consciousness— feeling

identical with pleasure.
b.

The other two elements

— cognitions

and volitions are

desirable and therefore part of ultimate good only

insofar as they are connected with feelings.

- 89 c.

Therefore it is the feeling in these elements
that is
part of ultimate good.

d.

Therefore desirable consciousness is in all cases
identical

with pleasure.

SECTION 10.

It has been proved in a negative way (by negation of

the two groups of answers) that ultimate good is desirable conscious-

ness

—which

means pleasure.

Sidgwick now pauses in the development

of his proof and makes a partial retreat.

A man may prefer a pain-

ful truth to a comfortable fiction but in this case he is not judg-

ing the conscious state as such but an objective relation.

Simi-

larly, a man may prefer painful freedom to comfortable slavery

because he has a predominant aversion to the latter.

In these cases

it would seem that there were desires which were not governed by

feeling merely as feeling (i.e. pleasure) but by some objective
standard.

If so, then the maxim of Benevolence would not lead to

utilitarianism alone.
But now Sidgwick moves forward to the positive and crucial
proof for pleasure as the sole ultimate good.

MI

think, however,

that this view ought not to commend itself to the sober judgement

of reflective persons.”
appeal firstly to his

32

The positive proof is twofold.

the reader's

”1

intuitive judgement after due

consideration of the question when fairly placed before it; and
secondly to a comprehensive comparison of the ordinary judgements

32.

Ibid., p. 400.
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of Mankind. n 53

Concerning the first part of the proof, he gives

his own intuitive judgement.
’’Admitting that we have actual experience of such
preferences
as have just been described, of which the ultimate
object is
something that is not merely consciousness: it still
seems to
me that when (to use Butler's phrase) we 'sit down in
a cool
hour' we can only justify to ourselves the importance
that we
attach to any of these objects by considering its conduciveness, in one way or another, to the happiness of sentient

being8."34
It seems then that there are no desires governed by objective

standards.

There only appear to be.

We also find this to be true

when we consider the second part of the proof

— the

study of Common

Sense judgements.

"...several cultivated persons do habitually judge that
knowledge, art, etc.—not to speak of Virtue are ends independently of the pleasure derived from them. But we may
urge not only that all these elements of 'ideal good’ are
productive of pleasure in various ways; but also that they
seem to obtain the commendation of Common Sense, roughly
speaking, in proportion to the degree of this productiveness. "55

—

In other words, any objective element is valuable roughly in pro-

portion to its pleasantness.

The inference seems to be that the

pleasantness is therefore what is valued.
35.

SECTION 11 .

Sidgwick has now proved, to his satisfaction, that the

ultimate good is pleasure (or desirable consciousness) and nothing
else.

It is pleasure, then, of which the wider intuitions of Prudence

(for egoism) and Benevolence (for utilitarianism) are to prescribe

33.

Ibid.

34.

Ibid., p. 401.
Ibid.

-91the distribution.

Thus we have found that the two methods which

the wider intuitions support are indeed hedonistic.

At this point it is necessary, for the sake of
clarity, to

review the somewhat different functions of Sidgwick’s various
wider
or philosophical intuitions.

We may recall that a primary reason

for distinguishing the wider intuitionism was in order to
establish
that any specific good, even though involving consequences, was in
a sense based on a right or duty

— the

duty to pursue it.

The in-

tuition which established that only pleasure is the good is presumably of this sort.

On the other hand, Sidgwick also relies on

philosophical intuitionism to establish his three methods of ethics.
Since the initial determination of these methods was based on the

common distinction between the right and the good, one would suppose that the provision of an intuitive basis for the methods would
also constitute an intuitive basis for the right and the good.

far as can be seen, this is what Sidgwick intends.

So

(Whether or not

he succeeds in this will he considered in the last chapter.)
Prom this review of Sidgwick’s philosophical intuitions, it is
evident that these intuitions not only provide the proof for the

validity of utilitarianism; they also establish the second and third
of the four propositions by which Sidgwick justifies his delineation
of the three methods of ethics.

56

They thus "prove” the validity

of egoism (and in a sense intuitionism) as well.

SECTION 12.

56.

How does our proof of utilitarianism compare now with

See Chapter IV, Section 5 of this thesis.

that of Mill’ 8?

We had first proved an abstract principle of
dis-

tribution—not just one, however, but two.
not know what was to be distributed.

Well, we now have our com-

modity, such as it is, but we are still
of distributing

reconciled?
efiort.

it— utilitarianism

Sidgwick’s answer is

At that time we did

tom

between two principles

and egoism*

no— not

Can the two be

at least by any human

he claims that both egoism and utilitarianism are equally

axiomatic and therefore concludes in the very last chapter of the
work"' that he has not succeeded in providing a rational morality.^ 8

For such a morality oannot be based on two different "methods".
'i'he

postulation of a god who reconciles these two methods to each

other would resolve this difficulty but there are no evident grounds
for this postulate.

We may conclude that Sidgwick’s hope— though

— to

not his express intention

reduce ethics to a single principle,

has not materialized.

37 * Book IV, concluding chapter entitled "The Mutual Relations of
the Three Methods"

Some of Sidgwiok’s critics have argued that he does not actually
38.
believe there is so serious a conflict between the two methods as he
appears to. In the course of my study I have not, however, found
sufficiently compelling arguments to assume that Sidgwick does not
mean what he says. In the concluding chapter he describes the reconciliation of the two methods as a matter of life or death to the
practical reason. In the description of his thought he states how
he slowly and reluctantly came to believe that no complete solution
between them was possible. In a previously quoted portion of the
preface to the second edition he denj.es the assumption of some
critics that he is a proponent of only one of the three methods he
examines.

CHAPTER VI

THE WORKABILITY OF UTILITARIANISM
SECTION 1 .

The distinction I have employed between the validity

and the workability of a moral principle (and consequently of the

definition of morality on which it is based) is not intended to be
an absolute one.

I use it merely as a convenient means of ordering

the arguments of Sidgwick and of Bentham and Mill.

Indeed, so far

as logical problems are conoemed, there seems to be no actual

distinction at all.

A moral principle which is illogical cannot

be valid, since it contradicts itself.

Neither, however, can such

a principle be workable since the more successfully one adheres to
it, the more successfully will he avoid it.
I treat Sidgwiok’s discussion of workability separately and

at some length, firstly, because the workability of utilitarianism

has been a key point at which to attack this principle.

Further-

more, Sidgwick presents in these discussions additional proofs for

his reduction of morality to utilitarianism.

Finally, it is in the

workability of utilitarianism, especially, that Sidgwick himself
clearly recognizes many of the difficulties of this principle.
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Sidgwick is almost exclusively conoerned with the
problems of work-

ability in Books II and IV,

In Book II on egoism, he understands

a method to mean determination of the most expedient
means to reach
the end (here, one’s own happiness).

In Book IV on utilitarianism

he understands it to mean, in general, the determination of
uncon-

ditional rules, obedience to which will itself bring about the end
(here, the general happiness).

Actually the method of egoism could,

as he admits, be applied equally well to utilitarianism. 1

His two

interpretations of method correspond roughly to the earlier and

later versions of utilitarianism.

What he prefers to call the method

of utilitarianism corresponds to the earlier version, as described

in Chapter II.

The method of egoism corresponds, when applied to

the utilitarian end, to the later version of Benthsm, according to

whom one sought the end directly and not by dutiful obedience to
rules.

The discussions in Books II and IV form, in effect, a contin-

uous argument, the conclusion of which is that the rules of duty
are themselves implicitly utilitarian and, though subject to serious
problems, are in general a better guide to the utilitarian end than
is the direct measurement of pleasure.

Thus this argument involves

a severe criticism (almost a refutation) of the positions of Bentham
and Mill, both of whom relied more or less confidently on the direct

measurement of pleasure for making utilitarianism work.

He does not suggest that the method he associates with utilitarianism could also be applied to egoism. This alternative seems
plausible however, particularly if one assumes a divine adjustment
of dutifulness and reward.
1.

—
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The criticism of the direct fona of utilitarianism
is the sub-

stance of Book II.

A proof for the indirect form together with a

very careful analysis of its problems is the substance of Book
IV.
I shall trace the progress of this argument through
Book II and then

through Book IV.

The problem of workability for Bentham's utilitarianism— and
for Sidgwick’ s "Method of Egoism"

— can

otherwise be stated as the

problem of measuring pleasure in order to determine what actions
will, in fact, provide the greatest pleasure.

Sidgwick agrees with

Bentham that only quantitative measurement is consistent with
hedonism

and.

Book II.

it is suoh measurement with which he is concerned in

Three techniques for measuring the pleasurable results

of actions are considered*
a.

reliance upon one’s own personal comparisons

— empirical

hedonism (or the empirical-reflective method),
b.

reliance upon the common opinions of mankind

— objective

hedonism,
c.

reliance upon general laws derived from a scientific

investigation of the concomitants of pleasure and pain
deductive hedonism.
The most important criticisms are given in the discussion of the

first technique

— empirical

hedonism— since Sidgwick concludes, as

we shall see, that the other two techniques are ultimately reducible to this one.

SECTION 2 .

Before proceeding to discuss each of the three
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techniques, Sidgwick gives his definition of pleasure
for measuring
purposes.

In the refutation of psychological hedonism, he
denied

Mill’s contention that pleasure and desire were identical—
we do not
always naturally seek pleasure.

In that argument he appeared to

understand pleasure as meaning the satisfaction of a desire.

would seem to he the definition most appropriate to hedonism.

This
But

pleasure can he understood to mean desire itself, in which case,
of course, the two are identical.

The latter may he called the

naturalistic definition and is, as we have seen, the basis of logical psychological hedonism.

Sidgwick seems here to indicate again

that he does not agree with the naturalistic definition hut does

agree with the hedonistic one.

He argues that there may he desires

which are out of proportion with the accompanying pleasure.
he says, pleasure must he defined in relation to desire.

Still,

”1 propose

therefore to define Pleasure. . .as a feeling which, when experienced

by intelligent beings, is at least implicitly apprehended as desirable or

— in

cases of comparison

— preferable.” 2

If pleasure is a feeling conceived as something one would want,

then it is probably understood here as the satisfaction of a desire.

There seem to be two possible meanings of

" feeling”.

One is that

it means satisfaction or dissatisfaction and in that case a desired

feeling would obviously mean satisfaction.

The other meaning of

feeling would be an emotion or sensation considered objectively.
However, if pleasure means merely an object which would be desired,

2.

The Methods of Ethics, p. 127-
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and not a satisfaction which would be desired, then
Sidgwick's def-

inition of pleasure is virtually equivalent to Mill's.

The only

difference is that while Mill says pleasure means what
you want,
Sidgwick says pleasure means what you apprehend as "wan table"
•
SDUTION 3 .

So far as utilitarianism is concerned, the burden of

Book II is to show the need for some method more effective than
direct measurement of pleasure for achieving the general happiness.
Nevertheless, Sidgwick does not believe that it is necessary to

altogether discard the direct method.

Thus, the criticisms he

gives he considers serious but not absolutely conclusive against

either egoism or utilitarianism.

Indeed the role he assumes in

this Book is not that of a critic but rather a defender of the

method of direct measurement against the objections raised by
others.

One of the logical difficulties facing utilitarianism, and

indeed any ethics of good, is that the consequences of an act appear
to be infinite and therefore impossible to measure by any definite

standard.

This i3 the first problem Sidgwick considers and, since

it is of particular importance and Sidgwick's discussion is rela-

tively brief, I quote him below.
"It may be objected that the calculation of the pleasurable
results of an act is too complex for practice; since any complete forecast of the future would involve a vast number of
contingencies of varying degrees of probability, and to
calculate the Hedonistic value of each of these chances of
feeling would be interminable. Still we may perhaps reduce
the calculation within manageable limits, without serious
loss of accuracy, by discarding all manifestly imprudent
conduct, and neglecting the less probable find less important
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contingencies ; as we do in some of the arts that
have more
definite ends such as strategy or medicine.
For if the
general in ordering a march, or the physician in
recommending
a change of abode, took into consideration all
the circumstances that were at all rel event to the end sought,
their
calculations would become impracticable; accordingly
they
confine themselves to the most important; and we may
deal
similarly with the Hedonistic art of life."5
Sidgwick’

s

conclusion seems to be that the problem of meas-

uring infinite consequences can be avoided by considering only
the
most important and most probable ones.
difficulties.

He then goes on to other

First he discusses what he considers to be two

rather minor ones.
An idealist of the time held that pleasure as feeling could
not be conceived apart from its conditions which were not feelings.
Sidgwick merely notes that his critic refutes himself
argues at great length about the concept pleasure.

— for

he

Another objec-

tion, quickly demolished, is that greatest pleasure cannot be real-

ized all at once and therefore cannot be an ultimate end.

The word

end, or good, is not commonly understood as a goal reached all at

once.

The remainder of the ohapter on empirical hedonism is devoted
to three very serious objections to which Sidgwick devotes most of

his attention.

The first objection is that if the more permanent

objects of pleasure

— such

as family, knowledge, culture, etc. are

sought as ends in themselves, then we no longer have hedonism.

If,

however, they are sought only as means to pleasure, it seems likely
that they will not provide it.

3.

Ibid., pp. 131-132.

While this problem is indeed the
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Fundamental Paradox of Egoistic Hedonism, says Sidgwick, it
merely
indicates the self-limiting nature of this goal— not its imposiihility.

First of all, there is oommonly an alternating rhythm

of self-regarding and extra-regarding impulses.^

-

Secondly, even

where this alternation is not adequate, as for example where someone initially has nothing but desire for pleasure, still it is

possible for him to achieve it.

It is simply necessary for him to

recognize first that the pursuit of other ends is needed for him
to attain pleasure and then to place himself under the control of

one of the many extra-regarding impulses which, at least latently,
still exist within him.

The second of these objections will also be found, in fact,

only to create a certain danger, but not to make hedonism impossible.
The practice of consciously measuring pleasures is apt to interfere

with our full enjoyment of them.

On the other hand, it would seem

that pleasure depends on consciousness and the more conscious we
are, the more pleasure we get.

At first sight we appear to have

here an irreconcilable contradiction.

Again the answer seems to

involve, though less explicitly, Sidgwick* s notion of an alternating

rhythm of extra-regarding and self -regarding impulses.

It is not

consciousness per se, but reflective consciousness, which interferes

with enjoyment.

Therefore, one must simply avoid measurement at the

moment of actual enjoyment (which is probably accompanying an extraregarding impulse) and engage in it later (presumably under the

4.

See Chapter IV, Section 4 of this thesis.
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influence of the self-regarding impulse).
The third and most serious objection is that the
results of

one's own measurement of pleasure are likely to be either
very

imprecise or actually false.

In order to determine the weight of

this objection, says Sidgwick, we must answer the following

questions.
a.

How far can each of us estimate his own past experience
of pleasures and pains?

b.

How far can the above knowledge permit forecasts of the
greatest happiness within one’s reach in the future?

c.

How far can one appropriate, for use in such forecasts,
the past experience of others?

Concerning the first question, it seems to Sidgwick that even
the simplest sort of comparison between two pleasures of the same
kind, such as the enjoyment of two types of food or of intellectual

activities, yields a definite result only if the differences in

pleasantness are great.

In the majority of cases where different

kinds of pleasures are compared, such as labor with rest or scientific knowledge with charitable enterprise—no confident decision
can be given.

Still further difficulties are involved when the

pleasures are mixed with some pain or when an attempt is made to
compare pure pleasures with pure pains and determine the quantity
of one which would exactly balance a quantity of the other.

We must then agree that the results of measuring one’s own
pleasure are not very precise.

We must also agree that they are
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apt to be false, since a man’s estimate of
any given pleasure is

likely to vary.

This is partly because some pleasures and
pains

are more easily recalled than others.

Thus we often pleasurably

recall a situation which was unpleasant at the
time.

What we are

recalling is the excitement, which would, by itself, have
been
pleasurable.

A second and more conspicuous cause of one’s vari-

ations in judgements about the same pleasure is a change
in mental

or bodily conditions.

The pleasures of appetite cannot be ade-

quately measured if we are full, and when we are hungry they are
apt to be exaggerated.

Furthermore, while feeling a pain or an

intense pleasure we will probably underrate other pains or pleasures.

These variations cannot be avoided by maintaining a passion-

less state.

Some pleasures require prior desire, even intense

desire, in order to be fully enjoyed.

In consideration of the above observations, we conclude that
it is very difficult to estimate one's past experience of pleasure

and pain.

Indeed, the problems exposed involve a more general pro-

blem as well.

Pleasure only exists as it is felt.

Whatever a

person thinks pleasurable, at the moment of feeling it, is pleasurable for him.

If this is so, however, it is impossible to prove

empirically that pleasures differ, such that each has a definite
intensity.

For only one pleasure is ever experienced at a time.

In the li^ht of the more general problem, any comparison that we

could make would, regardless of apparent precision or accuracy, be

merely imaginary .

Concerning this general problem, Sidgwick re-

marks, "If. . .we are asked what ground we have for regarding this
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imaginary result as a valid representation of
reality, we cannot
say more than that the belief in its general
validity is irresist-

ibly suggested in reflection on experience, and
remains at any rate

uncontradicted by experience

In other words, even if we have

no proof that there are really differences among pleasures,
ex-

perience "suggests" that there are.

And, Sidgwick argues in a

similar way, experience also suggests that we can measure pleasure—
at least roughly and for purposes of practical guidance.

We can

make a number of observations at different times and in different

moods and thus diminish the measuring error.
The final conclusion with respect to question (a) is that we
cannot prove empirically that there are any differences in pleasure
and, even if we could, such differences would be very difficult to

measure precisely and accurately.

Nevertheless, when we reflect

on experience we come to believe that such differences do exist and
that we can, at least roughly, measure them.

Question (b) concerned the extent to which our measurements

permitted forecasts of future greatest happiness.

In answer to

this question we find that all the problems which make it difficult

for us to measure past pleasures also reappear when we try to predict
future ones.

Both our tastes and susceptibilities may change.

The problems reappear again when we consider question (c).

In

addition there are certain other difficulties in trying to predict
what will give one pleasure on the basis of other people’s

5.

The Methods of Ethics , p. 146.
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experiences.

For one thing, these people may differ from
us.

For

another, our sympathetic awareness of alien
experiences may make

U3 bclieYe that we would enjoy or get pain from
something when we

actually would not.

We might, of course, be able to alter ourselves

so that we would enjoy what we did not before
but we do not know

how far this is possible.
Our final conclusion with respect to questions (b) and (c)
must then be the same as for (a).

Granted the apparent problems,

we do seem to measure pleasure.

SECTION 4 .

Can we avoid the difficulties of empirical hedonism by

resorting to objective or deductive hedonism?
is no.

Sidgwick s answer
»

These two techniques ultimately depend on empirical hedonism.

Objective hedonism— the reliance upon common opinions as to what
gives pleasure— could, at best, only be true for the average man and

actually there is no common agreement about the sources of happiness
or the order of their importance.

In interpreting for himself the

findings of objective hedonism, one is thus thrown baok on his own
opinions.

A view of hedonism falling midway between objective and

deductive hedonism is the view that doing what is right is the best
source of happiness.

This may be true in a settled state of society

but is not in periods of social unrest.

Moreover, that it appears

to be so is partly due to the force of law and public opinion, but
to avoid these one need only appear to do the right, not actually

do it.

In a perfect society this might not be so but it is now.

Deductive hedonism holds that there are physiological or
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psychological activities or functions that are
concomitants of

pleasure and pains.

It assumes that these concomitants are
them-

selves easier to measure and predict.

One philosopher holds that

medium activities are most pleasurable, another that
it is full
development of faculties.

Even assuming that the concomitants are

easier to measure, there is still the problem of measuring
the concomitance and this takes us back to all the problems of empirioal
hedonism.

Although not explicitly stated, this seems to be

Sidgwick* s conclusion respecting deductive hedonism.
To repeat, then, there is no way to avoid empirical hedonism

as the method of egoism— the only method by which an individual
seeks his own greatest happiness and one of the methods by which it
is possible to seek the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

There is one important qualification to these findings, however, especially with respect to objective hedonism.

Although there

is no agreement about the sources of happiness or their importance,

these disagreements only occasionally cause conflicts.

Common sense

opinions are still a generally valid guide to achievement of greatest happiness

—when

there are conflicts though, empirical hedonism

must decide.

SECTION 5 .

Granted the difficulties of empirical hedonism, is it

possible to find another method that might be more workable so far
as utilitarianism is concerned?

Sidgwick does not suggest that we

could find such an alternative for egoism but he does think that

we can do so for utilitarianism.

We recall that in Book III he
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eriticizes the narrower intuitionism-the morality
of common senseas being inconsistent and uncertain.

For similar reasons he holds,

in Book II, that common sense is not a valid
alternative to empirical hedonism.

In other words, common sense is not completely
ade-

quate when used to determine unconditional rules of duty
nor when

used to determine the best means to the egoistic end.

In both

cases, however, he maintains that it is generally adequate.

In Book IV, Sidgwick relies heavily on this position that

common sense judgements only occasionally conflict— position that
a

Mill and Bentham would not be likely to grant.

In that chapter he

maintains, in effect, that while common sense judgements are not
an adequate alternative to empirical hedonism as the method of
egoism, they are adequate as the method of utilitarianism.

Bentham

and Mill had argued, from observing the inconsistencies of duty
ethics, that such ethics should be completely replaced with utili-

tariamsm.

6

Sidgwick, making the same general observation but

assuming the general adequacy of duty ethics, reaches the rather
different conclusion that duty ethics is itself, though incompletely

and imperfectly, utilitarian.

The morality of common sense is an

attempt to reach the utilitarian end.

We noted in Chapter V how Sidgwick, after having established
the wider intuitions of benevolence, prudence and justice, maintained,

In his Utilitarianism , Mill did devote a chapter to showing
that the principle of justice was reducible to utilitarianism.
In so doing he indicated that the rules of justice were purely
expedient, however. He did not at all suggest, as did Sidgwick,
that they still carried about them something of the character of
absoluteness.
6.
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virtually no argument, that benevolence and justice
both

tended to support utilitarianism.

He then inferred that utili-

tarianism was, therefore, the fina] form into which
intuitionism
(the narrower intuitionism) tended to pass.

This position appears

to be what justifies him in taking the earlier
position (in Book I)

that egoism and utilitarianism were signifioantly distinct
methods

of ethics in the first place.

How in Book IV, which is on utilitarianism, we find a proof
of the former and, by inference, a proof of the latter of these two
positions.

And in so doing, we have justified the separate con-

sideration of utilitarianism by means of which we justify it.
What is the proof which accomplishes this?

What proof sup-

ports the position that common sense morality really is an attempt,

though incomplete, to achieve the utilitarian end?

For one thing,

utilitarianism supports, in general, the rules of common sense.
Moreover, where these rules conflict, utilitarianism is naturally

called in as arbiter.

Thirdly, when people interpret the same

rules differently or support different rules in the same age and
country, they are oommonly found to defend their respective posi-

tions with utilitarian reasons.

Finally, the differences in rules

between different ages and countries are usually found to be
strongly correlated to differences in the effects of action on
happiness.

This proof consists of faotual statements about which there
can, of course, be dispute.

Sidgwick devotes a chapter to this
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proof much of which consists in elaborating his
second point

utilitarianism arbitrates conflicts among rules.
consider some objections to his positions.

that

He does, however,

According to one view

utilitarianism cannot recognize any inequality in the treatment
of
persons whereas common sense prescribes it.

A person is held to

have special duties toward kindred and those in great need which
he does not have toward others.
Sidgwick.

This problem is not serious for

If inequality of treatment is the best practical way to

achieve the utilitarian end, as eeems to be the case, then there
is no conflict.

It may be claimed that utilitarianism asks more of men than

common sense does.

But in the practical application of utilitar-

ian impartiality, men have more knowledge of their own desires and

needs than they do of others and are thus better able than others
to provide for their own happiness.

Also, under the stimulus of

self interest, men are likely to accomplish more generally and thus

more greatly increase general happiness so far as it depends on
labor.

It may, on the contrary, be claimed that utilitarianism

asks less.

In answer to this objection Sidgwick doubts that common

sense does approve any striking disproportion between sacrifice and
benefit.

Furthermore, it is difficult to tell when there really

is a great disproportion because of the remote effeots and the

sympathetic pleasures which may accrue to the one who makes the
sacrifice.

Even if the disproportion is truly great it may be

justifiable in terms of utilitarianism to praise a disposition
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which, In general, would Incline toward the utilitarian
end.

Ihere is no claim made that the rules of common sense
morality
are perfectly utilitarian.
'’Indeed, if it [utilitarianism^] could succeed in proving
as
much as this, its success would be almost fatal to its practical claims j as the adoption of the Utilitarian principle
would then become a matter of complete indifference. Utilitarians are rather called upon to show a natural transition
from the Morality of Common Sense to Utilitarianism, somewhat like the transition in special branches of practice
from trained instinct and empirical rules to the technical
method that embodies and applies the conclusions of

science.

An additional reason, besides these given previously for

holding that common sense rules are instinctively utilitarian, is
the widely accepted theory that these rules derive from past ex-

perience of pleasures and pains.

Q

But if this theory is true, then

we have evidence that the rules could not be perfectly utilitarian.
We note, for one thing, that the average man is only partly able
to sympathize with the pleasurable and painful experience of his

fellows.

Furthermore, he may not be intelligent enough to see the

real cause of such experiences.

Suoh influences deflecting common

sense rules from utilitarianism would be somewhat counterbalanced

by the necessity that the ruleB should at least preserve the society.
But imperfect morality is only one danger to preservation and, in
any case, the rules could be perfectly preservative without providing

maximum happiness.

7.

Furthermore, rules appropriate for one time and

The Methods of ethics

,

p. 425.

Sidgwick implies that this theory cannot, on the other hand, he
used as Mill tried to use it to show that such rules «o not now
have the character of absolute Intuitions.
8.
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place might not be so at another.
e must conclude then, that we oannot
take the custfcensus of
competent judges, up to the present time, as to the
kind of
conduct which is likely to produce the greatest
amount of
happiness on the whole. It would rather seem that
it is the
*
unavoidable duty of a systematic Utilitarianism to make
a
thorough revision of these rules... "9
'

i

Thus in Book IV Sidgwiek presents in opposition to the
direct

form of utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill that
ism" which had proceeded them.

’’rule

utilitarian-

But he notes that a perfect rule

utilitarianism, in effect, ceases to be utilitarianism at all.

On

the other hand, if rules of duty are not perfectly utilitarian and

are yet the best means for achieving that end, then they must be

made so.

For it is ultimately utilitarianism and not duty ethics

(the ’’morality of common sense") upon which exact morality is based.

Sidgwiek considers what amount to three possible techniques

for altering the rules, each one being a bit less drastic than the
preceding.

These are*

1.

a complete revision of the moral code,

2.

retaining the existing code but making gradual modifications in it,

5.

retaining the existing code without any modifications
in the code itself but only in the form of exceptions to
the enforcement of it.

SECTIQH 6 .

Regarding the first technique, Sidgwiek finds that a

thorough revision of the rules encounters serious difficulties.

9.

The Methods of Ethics , p. 4^5«

In
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the first place, people vary greatly and
so then must the rules.

But if we consider only a limited homogeneous
group, we are dealing

with people who already have a definite code.

If we abstract their

code from them so as to replace it with a new
one, we are left with

purely hypothetical beings for whom it would be difficult
to construct a code.

We could not be sure in such a case that they would

immediately accept the utilitarian principle anyway.
It seems that even if the rules were thoroughly revised
the

new code could not be immediately introduced.

Still it might serve

as an ideal to which existing moral codes could gradually approximate.

But the latter plan also encounters difficulties.

His pres-

ent moral oode may be the best that a man can be made to obey.

Secondly, the other aspects of man's nature (which influence what

he finds pleasurable) may change, rendering the ideal obsolete before it is reached.

Spencer proposes to solve this latter problem

by constructing an ideal based not on man’s present nature but on
his nature in the final perfect society.

It seems difficult, how-

ever, to predict the nature and relations of such persons clearly

enough to formulate a moral code.

And even if we could do so, we

are presently far from such a society, and what appears to be the

most direct way to get there
be.

— obedience

to its moral code

—may

not

Finally, if we try to find some concomitant of happiness and

make that the practically, though not the theoretically, ultimate
end of our moral code we may find that what we thought to be a

concomitant actually is not.

Furthermore, there is no indication

,
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that we could apply such a supposed concomitant
as health or

preservation with any greater precision than happiness. 10

SECTION^,

bidgwick concludes from the previous considerations

that a thorough revision of the rules is impossible.

It is so

whether the new code is to immediately replace the existing
one or
only to function as an ideal.

Considering the second technique

he now finds that even gradual modifications of the existing
code
create serious difficulties.

In the first place, the only method

available by which to ascertain these modifications is empirical

hedonism and we have already seen the difficulties of that.
Sidgwick understands Mill to have tried to avoid these difficulties

by simply leaving a large area of activity completely unrestricted. 11
According to Sidgwick, the determination of the boundaries of this
area would itself have to be determined by empirical hedonism, and
furthermore, within that area a moral person who wished to be guided

by the principle of utilitarianism would still have to use that
method.

Given then empirical hedonism as the only possible method for

modifying common sense rules, we find in the second place that any
modification that contradicted an existing rule would be very difficult to justify.

The possible advantage would have to be weighed

against the pain of social disapproval for the one who suggested

Arguments similar to these are described in Section 4 of this
chapter in connection with the discussion of deductive hedonism.

10.

Sidgwick is referring here to what he considers the main thesis
11.
of Mill's essay On Liberty .
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the change, the weakening of the general
authority of moral rules

over men's minds, and the weakening in the man
himself of the force
of social approval— a force which tends to
strengthen the moral

authority of rules*
There axe also dangers in merely adding to the
rules without

contradicting any of them.

Granted that the one who suggests a

new rule can himself follow it, he may cause much annoyance
to
others and weakening of his own good example by trying to
persuade
them to obey it also*

SECTION 8 .

There are many problems involved even in a gradual

modification of the rules.

However, much of a utilitarian's

attempts to reform common sense rules will merely consist in getting
them enforced.

For many rules substantially directed to a utili-

tarian end receive formal acceptance but not the full support of

public opinion.
Now, even in the mere matter of enforcement there are diffi-

culties

— mainly

in determining what exceptions should be allowed.

This brings us to the third technique.

For, "...the admission of

an exception on general grounds is merely the establishment of a

more complex and delicate rule, instead of one that is broader and
simpler; for if it is conducive to the general good that such an

exception be admitted in one case, it will be equally so in all
similar cases."

12 .

12

Insofar as an exception is of this nature, it

The Methods of Ethics , p. 485*

-113seems to be subject merely to the difficulties
involved in adding
a rule, which Sidgwick has already discussed.

But there are cases

where it could clearly be conducive to the utilitarian
end that a
rule should not be applied to all similar cases.

For instance,

celibacy would be clearly immoral if universally followed but

would not otherwise be so considered.

It may in other words be

moral to do that which would be immoral if widely imitated, although
such cases must be rare.

Where these cases do occur the danger of

imitation may have to be avoided by doing the act secretly, and the
act may not be moral unless it is so done.

But the notion that

secret acts could be good would be undermining to morality.

"Thus

the Utilitarian conclusion, carefully stated, would seem to be
this; that the opinion that secrecy may render an action right

which would not otherwise be so should itself be kept comparatively
secret."

13

There can therefore be, in utilitarianism, grounds for

an esoteric morality at odds with the common sense morality.
From initially observing the rough coincidence of common sense
and utilitarianism we now find that there can actually be two di-

vergent and conflicting codes.
"...it may be said that these, too, form part of the complex
adjustment of man to his oiroumstances, and that they are
needed to supplement and qualify the morality of Common Sense.
However paradoxical this doctrine may appear, we can find
uses where it seems to be implicitly accepted by Common Sense;
or at least where it is required to make Common Sense consistent with itself.

13.

Ibid., p. 488.

14.

Ibid., p. 489*

- 114 -

Por instance, people commonly think that rebellions
are sometimes

morally necessary but these same people hold that such
rebellions
should be strongly resisted and their leaders severely
punished if
the rebellion fails.

3ECTI0M 9 .

We have considered the method of empirical hedonism—

the direct measurement of pleasure

— as

a means of achieving the

utilitarian (as well as the egoistic) end.

We have found that

this method seems to be almost completely unworkable though we do

appear to use it.

As an alternative we have considered using the

rules of common sense morality.

There is substantial empirical

evidence to the effect that these rules are instinctively utilitarian.

They are not however completely utilitarian; indeed, if

they were, utilitarianism would be unnecessary.
not, some revision of the rules is needed.

Since they are

We find, however, that

such revision is extremely difficult to justify.

Even worse, we

find that it is expedient for utilitarianism that there be two sets
of rules

— an

esoteric morality of rules which do not apply in all

similar circumstances, and a common morality of rules that do.

We

are not told that such a moral system would be unworkable, yet it
is admittedly paradoxical.

(Presumably the determination of which

of these sets of rules will apply in any given case is determined

by empirical hedonism though Sidgwick is not clear on this point.)

^

CHAPTER VII
SOME LOGICAL PROBLEMS OP SIDGWICK’ S PROOF

SECTION 1 .

I

have now indicated the problems which Sidgwick

encounters and recognizes in his own proof of utilitarianism.
tends to represent these problems as empirical ones.

He

Qnpirical

problems are problems resulting from the limitations of the physical world.

They are discoverable by sense observation and are

usually considered the province of scientists rather than
philosophers.
It seems, however, that the problems Sidgwick recognizes,

though presented as empirical, at least reflect logical problems.

That is, there appear to be logical contradictions involved in the

very meaning of the moral concepts used.

Furthermore, the logical

problems do not seem to be unique to utilitarianism.

They seem to

be, in most cases, merely altered forms of the problems of the

agathistic good.

The agathistic good is the definition of morality

on which utilitarianism is based.

1.

Through history they were not always so considered.
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The purpose of this chapter is twofold.

Firstly, I shall

explain in what way basic logical problems seem to be
reflected in
those problems Sidgwick encounters.

Secondly, I shall oonsider the

adequacy of Sidgwick* s solutions as solutions to these basic problems as well as to problems as he presents them.

SJ£TI0N_2.

There are two sorts of problems which Sidgwick recognizes

in his utilitarianism

— problems

of validity and problems of work-

ability.

There are two major problems of validity.

The first is the

problem involved in baaing a good (utilitarianism) on a duty (the
duty to pursue it).

Although Mill and Bentham seem to deny that

there are any duties at all, Sidgwick claims that they must acknowl-

edge a duty to pursue the utilitarian end.

He means that whether

or not a utilitarian, say, tells the truth may depend on the resulting general happiness, but whether or not he pursues the general

happiness does not depend on some still further result.

Pursuit

of the general happiness is an unconditional duty for a utilitarian.

The problem in this situation (a problem Sidgwick only implic-

itly mentions) is in the basic meaning of the word pursuit.
is an act of a moral agent.

Pursuit

The location of initiative for the act

can be one of three possibilities

— outside

the agent, inside the

agent, or partly inside and partly outside.

If the initiative is

wholly outside, then it seems that pursuit simply means obedience
to duty so far as morality is concerned.

dom used in this way, however.

The term pursuit is sel-

If the initiative is wholly inside,
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then pursuit simply means desire.
common.

This usage seems somewhat more

We may hear someone say that he desires this or that but

is too tired, busy, etc. to pursue it.

We interpret his statement

aa meaning that basically he does not desire the thing so much
as

he does the freedom from pursuing it, or he would pursue it.

Our assumption here is only, however, that pursuit and desire
occur together

—not

that they are the same.

Perhaps the most accurate description of the term pursuit is
that it involves initiative which is partly inside and partly outside the moral agent.

Strictly speaking, the term "interest" (or

desire) of interest ethics does not have an object.

merely refers to the fact of an act as such.

There the term

In the term "pursuit"

is the interest which has an object and the object itself is in

some way independent of interest.

It must be so since otherwise

pursuit would consist of nothing but interest in interest (a vicious
circle).

If the term "pursuit" is a composite of initiative partly in-

ternal and partly external to the moral agent, then it is very

similar to the term "good".

Both "pursuit" and the "good" refer

to desire for something independent of desire (in the case of the

good it might be phrased as something independent of desire which
is desired).

However, when the phrase "pursuit of the good" is

used and used meaningfully, the term "pursuit" is being considered
to mean the desire alone while the term "good" is being considered
to mean the something independent of desire.
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What does it mean to claim that there is a duty (something
independent of desire) to pursue the good in view of the
foregoing?
It seems to mean that the desire for something independent
of desire
is independent of desire, but this is a contradiction.

The apparent necessity to base a good on a duty, and yet the

contradiction involved in doing so, constitutes the first problem
of validity which Sidgwick indirectly encounters.

The second problem of validity is that of developing a con-

sistent moral system from two different and equally self evident

intuitions

— egoism

and utilitarianism.

Sidgwick states this as an

empirical problem but. it seems to reflect logical difficulties.

Even if the world was such that pursuit of one’s own happiness was
the best way to achieve general happiness, still the ultimate end

of any particular indi vidual would have to be a single one.

Accord-

ingly, one would choose either egoism or utilitarianism and the

fact that the other end was also achieved would be a matter of indifference.

The difficulty which I wish to emphasize, however, is that a
logical (rather than empirical) merger of utilitarianism and egoism
seems to Involve a merger of the agathistic and the hedonistio good

and such a merger is a contradiction.

The agathistic good means

that a duty makes itself interesting while the hedonistic good means

the opposite-

— that

interest makes satisfaction of itself a duty.

In the case of a merger of utilitarianism and egoism, this diffi-

culty is apt to be transformed into a vicious circle as follows*
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Interest makes the satisfaction of itself a duty.

b.

Satisfaction of private interest is equivalent to the
satisfaction of general interest.

c.

Satisfaction of general interest interests the moral
agent.

d.

Consequently, the interest whioh makes the satisfaction
of itself a duty is itself made by this duty.

The vicious circle involved in an attempt to merge, logically,

utilitarianism and egoism is the second problem of validity which
Sidgwick encounters, though this problem is not recognized by him
as such.

In his utilitarianism, Sidgwick encounters and recognizes a

great many problems of workability.

These problems are connected

with one or the other of the two techniques for achieving the utilitarian end
I

— direct

measurement of pleasure or rule utilitarianism.

want to point out some logical difficulties reflected in the pro-

blems of these two techniques.

Specifically, I will note three log-

ical problems reflected in the problems of direct measurement and

one in the problems of rule utilitarianism.

Sidgwick recognizes that the consequences of an act seem to be

infinite and therefore difficult to measure.

This is the first of

the logical problems of direct measurement and is one of those

Sidgwick most clearly recognizes as such.

Of course, stated as a

logical problem, the consequences are not merely difficult but im-

possible to measure.

- 120 -

Sidgwick also observes that one is more apt to be successful
in achieving pleasure if one does not pursue it directly but,
instead, pursues objective values such as knowledge or culture.

This

problem seems to be a reflection of the second logical difficulty.

That difficulty is that one cannot have a desire merely for the
satisfaction of desire.

Sidgwick recognizes the difficulty when

he uses it as his criticism of psychological hedonism.

He does

not, however, consider it a logical one and he only claims that

satisfaction of desire cannot be the only end, not that it cannot

be the ultimate end.

However, it seems that satisfaction of desire

cannot be an ultimate end, since an ultimate end is unconditional

while satisfaction of desire is conditional on some objective desire.

Sidgwick raises several other objections to the technique of
direct measurement, all of which seem to reflect the same logical
problem.

He argues that the reflection necessary for measurement

of pleasure is apt to interfere with its enjoyment.

Moreover, the

measurement is likely to be too subjective due to such things as
mental and bodily changes.

Finally, pleasure only exists while felt

and only one pleasure can be felt at a time, so there is no proof

that there are any differences among pleasures in the first place.

The logical problem here is that objective measurement of

pleasure seems impossible.

The technique of direct measurement in-

volves the measurement and comparison of the pleasurable results
of various acts.

It means the ability to determine how much of
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what one wants is produced by one aot as compared with what
is pro-

duced by another.

In order for one to determine this, there must

be some standard of comparison.
It seems obsious that the standard of comparison must be what

one wants.

Once the most pleasurable acts have been determined,

they are, for hedonism, the ones to be ohosen.
must be a basis for the choice of these acts.

Accordingly, there
It seems that the

basis for this choice must also he what one wants.

Consequently,

the choice of an act is its own standard of comparison and no

separate (objective) standard exists.
Sidgwick' e argument that the reflection necessary for meas-

uring pleasure interferes with it clearly reflects the above problem if reflection is understood as application of an objective
standard.

One cannot get what one wants by comparing acts in terms

of something other than what one wants.
The argument that measurement of pleasure is subjective also
clearly reflects the logical difficulty described.

Sidgwick also denies that there is any proof of differences

among pleasures in the first place.
above difficulty.

This claim also reflects the

If the very ohoioe of a given act is itself the

standard for measuring its pleasurable results, then comparison is

impossible— for comparison requires a standard separate from any
particular act.
Besides the problems of direct measurement, Sidgwick also

mentions several problems of the other technique of utilitarianism—

- 122 -

rule utilitarianism.

He points out, early in his disoussion, that

rules of duty must not be perfectly utilitarian; for if they are,
then the deliberate choice of the utilitarian end is a matter of

indifference.

(I

might add that the moral agent must necessarily

be indifferent to the utilitarian end, since he cannot owe ultimate

allegience to two different moral systems.)
As a matter of fact, Sidgwiok believes that rules of duty tend
to be, but are not perfectly, utilitarian.

fectly utilitarian, they must be made so.

Since they are not perOtherwise, obedience to

duty does not always achieve the utilitarian end.

Sidgwick finds,

however, that it would be very difficult to adjust the rules for

closer fit.

It would be difficult either to get such an adjustment

accepted or to justify it.

He also observes that certain duties

best serve the utilitarian end if they are obeyed by some but not
by all.

Duties such as celibacy are of this nature.

Accordingly,

rule utilitarianism requires that there be an esoteric morality
(indeed a secret morality) in addition to, but different from, the

public rules of duty.
The logioal difficulty reflected in the foregoing problems is
that rules of duty are by definition absolute and unconditional.

Therefore, they cannot be adjusted to better achieve some end.

If,

as a matter of empirical fact, the rules of duty are perfectly

utilitarian to begin with, then, as Sidgwick says, adoption of the

utilitarian end is a matter of indifference.

If it is claimed that

duty ethics and utilitarianism are logically equivalent, this claim
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In view of the foregoing, it would be not merely difficult

but logically impossible to get an adjustment of the rules accepted,

or to justify it.

As for the position that utilitarianism may re-

quire an esoteric morality as well as the common one, this problem
does not seem to be, in itself, a logical one.

It is not illogical

to claim that 7/hat is a duty for one person or at one time need not

be so for another person or at another time.
Instead of the position that a single set of rules is per-

fectly utilitarian, one might just as feasibly adopt the position
that it is the interaction among a number of different sets that
is perfectly utilitarian.

However, this position, while it would

avoid the problem of an esoteric morality, would face all the other
The basic logical problem of rule utilitarian-

problems mentioned.
ism

— that

SECTION 3 .

it is a contradiction in terms

—would

still remain.

Prom the analysis of the preceding section, it appears

that there are at least six different logical problems reflected
(See

in the problems of utilitarianism which Sidgwick recognizes.
the following chart.

)

I do not think, however, that these logical

problems are unique to utilitarianism.

They seem to be merely

altered forms of the problems of a definition of morality.

One

would expect that this definition of morality would be the agathistic
good, since that is the definition on which utilitarianism is based.

In some cases this is so but not in all.

The probable reason is

object
that utilitarianism is the one type of agathistic good whose
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SIX LOGICAL PROBLEMS OF UTILITARIANISM

1.

It is a contradiotion to maintain that "pursuit of the good"

(the desire for something independent of desire) is a duty and

therefore independent of desire.

2.

Egoism (the hedonistic good) and utilitarianism (an agathistic

good) cannot he reduced to each other without resulting in a vicious

circle to the effect that the duty which makes itself desired is

created by this desire.

5.

The consequences of an ant are infinite and impossible to

measure by a finite standard, such as the good is.

4.

The ultimate end of desire cannot be merely satisfaction of

desire.

5.

This is a vicious circle.

The measure of pleasurable acts is identical with the choice

of such acts.

It is logically impossible to provide an objective

measure of pleasurable acts as a basis for this choice.

6.

Rule utilitarianism is a contradiction since rules of duty

are absolute and not conditional on some end.

s

)

-125is roughly similar to the hedonistic good.

As it happens , Sidgwick'

treatment of the problems of direct measurement is undertaken
in the

context of egoistic hedonism and this is the hedonistic not the

agathistic good.
The purpose of this section is to indicate in what way the
basic problems of moral definition have been altered to result in
the problems noted.

It will be recalled that, according to the agathistio good,

morality is ultimately based on duty but the duty attracts the agent
to it and in that sense involves interest.
Although, there may he others, I have recognized two major

problems of the agathistic good.

When morality means the pursuit of some goal, an act is
judged not for itself but for its consequences. However, the
consequences of an act are infinite and thus impossible to
measure. This may be called the problem of infinite consequences.
1.

When morality means a duty which appeals to some interest
of the agent, this interest must in turn be the appeal of some
further duty and so on ad infinitum. Otherwise, morality is
ultimately a matter of interest alone.
2.

The problem of infinite consequences Sidgwick himself explic-

itly states, though he tends not to regard it as a particularly
serious one.

(Problem

3*

If one attempts to merge the good with duty ethics, as Sidgwick
does in his rule utilitarianism, then the problem of infinite con-

sequences will be avoided.

For one will have combined a monistic

definition of morality with a dualistic one.
of duty.

One simply obeys rules

However, this attempted solution transforms the infinite
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consequences into a contradiction in terms.

(Problem 6.)

Sidgwick does not explicitly state the problem of infinite
regress, but two of the logical problems I have noted seem to be

altered forms of this difficulty.

According to the agathietic good, an object independent of
interest makes itself interesting.

There must, however, be a

source of this interest and for the aga this tic good it is
object.

If, however, one denies that there is a

hi^er

a

higher

object,

then one must claim that the object which is independent of interest is nevertheless itself interesting.

To put it another way,

the desire for something independent of desire is independent of
desire.

(Problem 1.)

This position transforms the infinite re-

gress into a contradiction.

One may attempt to merge the two forms of the good, as

Sidgwick wishes could be done (a merger of egoism and utilitarianism).

In that case, there will be no infinite regress.

For the

duty which makes itself desired will be created by that same desire.
This, however, is a vicious circle.

(Problem 2.)

The last two of the six logical problems seem to be altered
forms of the hedonistic rather than the agathistic good.

According

to the hedonistic good, morality is ultimately based on interest

but interest makes the satisfaction of itself a value and in that
sense duty is involved.

The hedonistic good faces the same problem of infinite consequences as does the agathistic good.

It also, however, faces a
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distinctive problem of infinite regress.
If satisfaction of interest is a value, this value iauat be
the object of some further interest and so on ad infinitum.
Otherwise, morality is ultimately a matter of duty alone.
If one denies that there is a higher interest in the satis-

faction of interest, then there will be no infinite regress.

How-

ever, interest in satisfaction of the self same interest is merely

a vicious circle.

(Problem 4»)

Moreover, if there is no higher interest, then measurement of
the amount of interest satisfaction provided by various acts must

be made in terms of the self same interest.
jective standard of measurement is possible.

SECTION 4

.

Consequently, no ob-

(Problem

5 .)

The solutions which Sidgwick offers to the problems he

recognizes can, in view of the foregoing, also be considered solutions to the problems of the agathistic good (or in some oases, to
those of the hedonistic good).

If Sidgwick is to succeed in reducing

morality to utilitarianism, it is not enough, however, for him to
solve the problems of the aga thistle good.

He must also, as the

negative aspect of his proof, discredit the other three definitions
of morality.

This he clearly does not do.

On the contrary, he

claims that utilitarianism (an agathistic good) is really the per-

fected form of duty ethics and he would like to find evidence for

believing that satisfaction of one’s own desires (the hedonistic
good) was exactly fitted to achieve the utilitarian end.

The only

one of the four definitions of ethics which Sidgwick clearly dis-

credits is interest ethics.
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It may be that Sidgwick* s negative proof has to be
inadequate

in order for his positive proof to have even the appearance
of

cogency.

From my original analysis of fbur definitions of morality,

it seemed that each definition contained part but not all of what

was necessary to make a moral system logically consistent.

More-

over, each definition alone had some serious logical flaw.

If

this analysis is correct, then even the mere appearance of positive

proof of some principle would require a merger of several definitions.

Sidgwick* s positive proof for utilitarianism seems, on the
surface, to be more adequate than his negative proof.

Three of the

solutions he offers to his problems seem to function as solutions
to the problem of infinite regress.

For one thing, Sidgwick claims that the duty to pursue the
good is not a duty like other duties.

he calls it, a wider intuitionism) .
does not recognize a wider interest.

It is a wider duty (or as

On the other hand, Sidgwick
If this is so, then there is

no infinite regress but neither does one have an ethics of good
any longer.

Since the wider duty is ultimate, morality is a matter

of obedience to this unconditional rule and faces the usual criticism of duty ethics

— that

it seems contradictory.

A second argument which appears to be a solution to the problem of infinite regress is the argument from common experience.
This is Sidgwick’s final answer to his own problems of workability.
No matter how paradoxical the technique of direot measurement may
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appear, experience indicates that it is workable.

Phrased in terms

of the problem of Infinite regress, one would say that
experience

indicates that pursuit of the good is possible even though illogical.

This sort of argument doesn’t even claim to solve logical

problems— but only suggests that the world is illogical and solutions are therefore unnecessary.

Its difficulty is that it can be

used by anyone to support anything.
If it can be shown that egoism (the hedonistic good) and

utilitarianism (an agathistic good) are logically compatible, (not
merely compatible in fact) then this might be a third solution to
the problem of infinite regress.

However, these two principles do

not seem to be logically compatible and, in any event, Sidgwick

only looks for empirical compatibility and does not find even that.
Some of Sidgwick’ s solutions to his problems funotion as solutions to the problem of infinite consequences rather than to the

problem of infinite regress.
Sidgwick directly faces the problem of measuring infinite consequences and claims that one can avoid this problem by concen-

trating on the most important and most probable ones.

This solu-

tion seems to beg the question since it is impossible to know what
the most important ones are unless one has a view of them

all— for

the most important ones are not necessarily the moat probable.

Sidgwick ’s concept of the wider intuitionism seems to function
as a solution to the problem of infinite consequences, as well as
to the problem of infinite regress.

If pursuit of the good is
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itself a duty, then one ultimately does not need to measure
infinite consequences.

He only needs to obey the duty.

The concept

of the wider duty is, however, subject to the difficulty previously
noted.

Moreover, an ultimate duty to pursue the good is doubly

difficult.

For the problem of measuring infinite consequences still

remains within the substance of the duty.

A third possible solution to the problem of infinite consequences would be rule utilitarianism, whereby one would automatically
achieve the utilitarian end by obedience to rules.

Rule utilitar-

ianism is, however, a contradiction in terms, as Sidgwick indirectly
recognizes.

Here again he invokes common experience as an answer

to its paradoxical nature.

And, again, it is not an answer to any

logical problem.

There are three other important statements of Sidgwick* s which
could be construed as solutions to one or the other of the two basic

problems I have been considering.
Sidgwick claims that one pursues an end not because of desire

for it but because of an "impulse” toward it.

The term "impulse"

must mean desire, duty (initiative independent of desire) or a combination.

If it means duty, which is most likely, then this way

of describing the good converts it into the right.

1

In that case,

the problems of the agathistic good are, of course, avoided but

only to be replaced with those of duty ethics.
Sidgwick has an unusual definition of the good.

1.

See Chapter I, Section 5 of this thesis.

He virtually
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defines it as perfectly enlightened interest, yet presumably
means
it to retain its character of absoluteness independent of
interest.^

This is a contradiction in terms but if the contradiction is not

recognized it may appear that the good and interest are merged.
Sidgwick also has an unusual definition of the right.

He

defines it in such a wey that it requires consideration of all

foreseen consequences and yet is still presumably in no way a

matter of interest.

3

This too is a contradiction in terms and,

here, if the contradiction is not recognized, it may appear that

the good and the right are merged.

Prom the discussion of this section, I reach the conclusion
that the solutions Sidgwick provides to the problems of his utili-

tarianism encounter their own problems in turn.

None of his pro-

posed solutions seem to be adequate either for the problems of

utilitarianism or for the aga thistle good, on which it is based.

SECTION 5 *

It has been frequently mentioned in the course of this

thesis that the logical problems of morality seem to be problems

of definition .

Once a definition of morality has been accepted,

there seem to be no particular logical problems in determining
specific moral principles.

Despite this situation, much of

Sidgwiok’s thought is devoted to determining moral principles per
se and much of the criticism he has faced is criticism of these

2.

See Chapter V, Section 9 of this thesis.

3.

See Chapter V, Section 2 of this thesis.
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principles.

Accordingly , it seems important to consider these

principles and some of the criticisms against them.
Since Sidgv/ick inclines, in hia thought, toward the pole of
duty rather than that of interest, he considers that moral prin-

ciples are derived hy intuition.

He denies the certainty of duty

ethics per se but claims that there are wider intuitions which

establish both duty ethics and two ethics of good

— egoism

and

utilitarianism.

An intuition is, by definition, self evident and one would
therefore expect that Sldgwick's wider intuitions could be pre-

sented very briefly and without supporting argument.

There may be

situations, however, in which one intuition, while not immediately

self evident, is based on another intuition which is.

(Of course

in this situation there must also be an intuition to the effect
that the more evident intuition is indeed the basis of the less

evident one.)

Sldgwick's intuitions seem to be of this nature;

for he gives considerable space to justifying the intuitions he
claims to have.

Sldgwick's first intuition

— the

maxim of Justice

— is

that:

''It cannot be right for A to treat B in a manner in which it
would be wrong for B to treat A, merely on the ground that
they are two different individuals, and without there being
any difference between the natures and circumstances of the
two which can be stated as a reasonable ground for difference of treatment. **4

Sidgwick claims that the maxim of Justice is the basis for

4.

The Methods of Ethics , p. 380.
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duty etnics (what he calls the morality of common, sense)*

not immediately evident to me that this is the case.

It is

In the first

place, if "reasonable ground for difference of treatment" means

intuitive ground, then the maxim would not be accepted by a pro-

ponent of interest,

fie

would claim that a person's desire was quite

sufficient ground for treating another differently than he would
expect to be treated himself.

Another problem is that if one con-

siders morality in complete abstraction from the nature and circumstances of an individual, then individuality virtually ceases to
exist.

Obviously, it is logically impossible for there to be dif-

ferences in moral aots if there are no individuals to act.

The

point at issue ought to be whether there ere ary differences when
the nature and circumstances of the individual are considered.

Sidgwick' s second wider intuition is the maxim of Prudence.

This maxim is that

H.

.

.Hererf ter as such is to be regarded neither

less nor more than now"
life.

egoism.

5

with respect to an individual's conscious

According to Sidgwick, this maxim is the basis of an abstract
Sidgwick explains that the intuition means no temporal part

of the good for any individual should be preferred to any other part

merely on the basis of the time difference.
is not what the original maxim says.

Strictly speaking, this

The maxim, explained, seems to

rest on the implied assumption that what one ought to do is to properly dist r ibute t he good and then merely goes on to indicate what

a proper distribution entails.

5.

Ibid., p. 581*

I do not find the implied assumption
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to be self evident— particularly in the absence of
an indication

as to what the good is.

Determination of what the good is, however,

Sidgwick relegates to a separate intuition.
11 ^ne does assume that what he ought to do is to properly

distribute the good, then is the maxim of Prudence convincing?

Is

it intuitively convincing that no temporal part of the good should

be preferred to any other on the basis cf the time difference alone?
Yes, I think it would be so if one could abstract so completely from

the time difference as to even disregard the agent's aversion to a
delay.

In that case, it would be logically impossible for the moral

agent to prefer some temporal part of the good on the basis of the
time difference alone, but only because the time difference had no

relation at all to his interest or duties.

The real question for

morality, in the case of this maxim, is whether when interest and

duties are considered it is still true.
The third maxim, the maxim of Benevolence, is that "...each
one is morally bound to regard the good of any other individual as

much as his own, except insofar as he Judges it to be less, when
impartially viewed, or less certainly knowable or attainable by
him."

£

This maxim, says Sidgwick, is the basis of a general util-

itarianism— a utilitarianism not made exact however, until one
determines, by a separate in tuition, what the good is.

Although this maxim is an intuition, it is,

6.

Ibid., p. 382.

s aye Sidgwick,

—
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a deduction from two other intuitions.

One of these is that the

good of one individual is no more important, from the
point of

view of the universe, than that of any other unless more good
oan
be realized for one than the other.

The other intuition is that

one is bound to aim at good generally and not at a particular part.
The maxim of Benevolence seems to me to have some of the same

difficulties as does the maxim of Prudence.

It, too, is phrased

in terms of the good without any explicit indication that this is
part of the intuition.

It has a similar logical certainty if the

maxim is understood such that preferences are considered in complete
abstraction from the individuals who hold them.

The problem for

the maxim of Benevolence is not to establish that the good, con-

sidered apart from the moral agent, is equal for all but that it
is so when the moral agent's interest and duties are considered.

These three intuitions of Sidgwick have been the subjeot of

much criticism.

Indeed the main point I make here has, in slightly

different form, already been advanced by prior critics.

Both P. H. Bradley and Ernest Albee argue that the maxims
particularly those of Justice and Benevolence

— are

merely state-

ments of the objectivity involved in any moral system.

Any moral

system implies that there is some reason for a person’s acts independent of the person who does them.
I

7

would agree with this criticism in general but not completely.

See especially Albee, A History of English Utilitarianism ,
p. 4045 also Bradley, Mr. Sidgwick s Hedonism , Section 77.

1
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Those who hold interest ethics would deny that objectivity
is in-

volved in every moral system.

Moreover, duty ethics may be inde-

pendent of a person only in the sense that the duty is independent
of what he wants and not in the sense that it is the same for

everyone.

Besides the three intuitions already mentioned, Sidgwick has
another which is necessary in conjunction with Prudence and Benevolence to establish egoism and utilitarianism.

This is the intui-

tion which establishes what the good is, and it establishes that
it is pleasure.

Bradley points out, however, that the intuition

that the good is pleasure seems merely to be based on ambiguous

use of the word "desirable".

8

Mill, in his proof of Utilitarianism, argued that the only

proof there was that a thing was desirable was that people did in
fact desire it.

He also argued that since pleasure was the only

thing they could desire, it must include what they ought to desire.
The second argument is the position of psychological hedonism and
was criticized by Sidgwick.

The first argument has been generally

held to rest on a mere verbal ambiguity between two meanings of the
word desirable

— the

one (and more common) meaning being what ought

to be desired, the other what simply is desired.

Bradley holds

that Sidgwick’ s proof of pleasure as the sole ultimate good involves
this same ambiguity as did Mill' 3.

At some points, Sidgwick defines

the desirable as the good, at others he defines it as pleasure—

8.

Bradley, Mr. Sidgwick* s Hedonism , Section

3.
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meaning what is desired.
is the good.

Thus obviously he can prove that pleasure

How if we will reconsider the quotation and subse-

quent comments from Sidgwick' s preliminary proof as discussed in

Chapter V, Section 9, we will see,

I think,

the truth of Bradley's

criticism.

Sidgwick asks "Shall we then say that Ultimate Good is Good or

Desirable conscious or sentient Life...?" 10
is true, but a rhetorical one

— for

This is a question it

the answer we finally reach is

Now if this question, understood as the statement

a decided yes.

it really is, is considered to be proved, then it is subject to

Bradley’s criticism.

If desirable merely raeanB the good, as

Sidgwick virtually suggests by a phrase indicating that the two
terras are synonyms,

then his statement is a mere tautology.

If

however, desirable merely means what is desired, or pleasure, then

we must look elsewhere than in his argument for the proof that
pleasure is the good.
Sidgwick*

ure

i3

s

final argument for holding that the good is pleas-

not subject to the above criticism.

For his final argument

is on the one hand a straightforward personal intuition and on the

other a comprehensive comparison of common sense judgements.

Both Bradley and another critic, G. E. Moore, agree that of
the two parts of this proof-- the appeal to the reader's own intuitive

Sidgwick does not always define pleasure as desire, however,
though he does in connection with this proof. Sometimes he defines
See Chapter VI, Section 2 of this
it as satisfaction of desire.
thesis.

9.

10.

The Methods of Ethics, pp. 395-96.

•
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judgement and the comprehensive comparison of common sense judge-

ments— the second lacks any force. 11

For in this regard, Sidgwick

finds that Common Sense approves actions roughly in proportion to
the pleasure they produce, hut that finding only proves that virtue

in general is pleasant, not that pleasure is the end.

Moore adds

the further point that if Sidgwick's proof is merely considered the

personal intuition he claims, then anyone with a different intuition

may simply deny it.
From this review of Sidgwick's four wider intuitions, it appears
that none of them establish what they are intended to establish.

Their intuitive certainty results from their being either tautologies

or definitions.

Even if they were intuitively certain, however, they

would not resolve the logical problems of utilitarianism.

For these

problems -underlie the very technique of gaining moral principles by
Intuitions.

11.

Bradley, Mr. Sidgwick's Hedonism . Section 6
Moore, Principia Bthica , Section 54
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SECTIOK 6. The purpose of this thesis has been to expose
the
problems encountered by Heniy Sidgwick in his attempt to base
morality on the utilitarian principle.

My approach in this thesis was to focus upon strictly logical problems and to consider those problems which were basio to the very
definition of morality on which utilitarianism is based.
procedure was to first consider the problems encountered by
Sidgwick’ s utilitarian predecessors, follow this with a consideration of the problems Sidgwick himself encountered and recognized,
and complete the study with an exposition of the problems Sidgwick
encountered but did not fully recognize.

J4y

I found that Sidgwick’ s proof for the validity of utilitarianism
was almost exactly opposite that of his predecessors. He emphasized
the aspect of duty while they emphasized the aspect of interest as
the basis of the principle.

The problems which Sidgwiok found in his predecessors' proof for
utilitarian validity, he felt he had at least partly solved. He
was not so confident of his solutions to the problems of making
utilitarianism work. These problems he explored very thoroughly,
however.

Most of Sidgwick' s problems he represented as empirical, but there
seemed to be clearly logical problems reflected in them. Upon analysis, it seemed that these problems were (for the most part) merely
altered forms of the problems of the agathistic good.
Sidgwick 1 s solutions to the problems he encountered and recognized
may also be considered as solutions to the logical problems of the
agathistic good. Considered either way, they did not seem adequate.
One important solution— the wider intuitionism seemed to convert
the good into the right. Other solutions 3uch as rule utilitarianism seemed to be simply contradictions in terms. Still others, invoking common experience, did not even attempt to solve logical
problems.
The conclusion of this thesis is, therefore, that Sidgwick thoroughly considered many of the serious logical problems of utilitarianism, though he himself tended to understand them as empirical
difficulties discovered by empirical observation. He did not, however, solve these problems. His attempted solutions seem to be
logical fallacies or else simply appeals to common experience.

•
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